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THE CHURCH, THE STATE AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE
PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS
KENNETH

J. KRYVORUKA*

Cases challenging, under the first amendment, 1 an intrusion or
involvement by the state in the affairs of the church persistently
have presented some of the most perplexing and controversial constitutional questions considered by the Supreme Court. 2 A total
separation between church and state has never been considered
either practical or desirable; "where questions of entanglement are
involved, the Court has acknowledged that, as of necessity, the
'wall' is not without its bends and may constitute a 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a
particular relationship.' ' '3 Perhaps no aspect of this issue is more
warmly disputed than the validity of state involvement in private
school education. Although most of this controversy has focused
upon state aid to private sectarian institutions,4 the question of
entanglement also may arise when the state or federal government
attempts to regulate the activities of a parochial school.5 Recent
litigation challenging governmental regulation of the secular conduct of private sectarian schools has resulted from an inability to
distinguish clearly areas that are secular, and thus susceptible to
regulation, from those concerns that are purely religious.
The National Labor Relations Act' [NLRA] vests in the National Labor Relations Board the power "to prevent any person from
* University Fellow and Lecturer in Law, National Law Center, George Washington University.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ."

2. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973).
3. Id. at 761 n.5 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
4. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
5. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (state may test both teachers and
students in parochial schools to ensure minimum standards of instruction are met); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (examination of parochial school records by state to deter-

mine amount spent on secular education constitutes unconstitutional entanglement of church
and state); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state may regulate conduct of
secular education but not compel attendance in public schools only).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1970).
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engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce." 7
Attempts by the Board to exert jurisdiction over lay teachers seeking recognitional rights from parochial schools highlight the potential conflict between interests protected under the first amendment
and those safeguarded by the NLRA. The issue is whether regulation of labor relations in the parochial schools interferes with the
religious interests of the parochial school employer, thereby breaching the barrier between church and state.
The magnitude of the problem may be appreciated when it is
recognized that collective bargaining in parochial schools will affect
more than 100,000 lay faculty and nearly 10,000 primary and secondary schools affiliated with the Catholic Church alone.8 Although
the Board has asserted jurisdiction over parochial schools across the
nation,9 not until quite recently did sectarian employers challenge
this assertion of jurisdiction in the courts on first amendment
grounds.
In Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB,10 the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held that the Board's assertion of regulatory
authority over the Catholic schools was unconstitutional. The employees' labor interests evidently were outweighed by the church's
7. Id. § 160(a).
8. In 1972, there were over 18,000 elementary and secondary sectarian schools in the United
States teaching 5.2 million children. PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON NONPUBLIC EDUCATION, FINAL
REPoRT 5-6, 15-19 (1972). Some 107,856 lay faculty members in 9,976 primary and secondary
schools are affiliated with the Catholic Church. OFFICIAL CATHOLIC DIRECTORY 1-2 (1977).
9. See Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. 1178, 94 L.R.R.M. 1719 (1977); Diocese
of Fort Wayne - South Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 92 L.R.R.M. 1550 (1976); Cardinal
Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 92 L.R.R.M. 1114 (1976) (Los Angeles); Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 220 N.L.R.B. 359, 92 L.R.R.M. 1492 (1975); Roman Catholic Archdiocese
of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 88 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1975); Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n,
213 N.L.R.B. 415, 87 L.R.R.M. 1403 (1974) (Brooklyn, New York). Some of these schools have
submitted voluntarily to collective bargaining. See Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B.
1178, 1180 (1977).
10. 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978). Appeals challenging
the constitutionality of the NLRA as applied to religiously affiliated schools are also sub
judice in Caulfield v. Hirsch, 410 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Pa. 1977), appealpending, No. 77-1328
(3d Cir.) (appeal from district court's assertion of jurisdiction based on constitutional considerations to enjoin Board from conducting representation proceedings); Gordon Technical
High School v. NLRB, No. 77-1583 (7th Cir.); Cardinal Timothy Manning v. NLRB, No. 771286 (9th Cir.).
Recently, in McCormick v. Hirsch, 99 L.R.R.M. 3342 (M.D. Pa. 1978), the court ruled that
it had subject matter jurisdiction over a suit seeking injunctive relief, on first amendment
grounds, to prevent the Board from asserting jurisdiction over a Catholic high school. The
court relied largely upon the Seventh Circuit's decision in Catholic Bishop of Chicago.
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right to be free of what was characterized as governmental intrusion
into matters of faith and religious practice." The effect of this decision is clear: lay teachers, unlike other employees protected by the
Act, must either accept the unilateral terms and conditions of employment extended by their employer or cease employment.
Although the issue of collective bargaining in the parochial
schools is novel to the courts, the Board has had experience in
accommodating its assertion of jurisdiction over religiously affiliated schools in deference to the first amendment rights of the employer."2 Unlike the court in CatholicBishop of Chicago, the Board
has determined that the secular interests of the employees in furthering their organizational objectives outweigh any indirect in11. 559 F.2d at 1117-28. The interests before the court are reflected in the manner in which
the parties framed the issues in the petition for certiorari and in the brief in opposition. The
Board emphasized the secular aspects of the schools, Petition for Certiorari at 2, NLRB v.
Bishop of Chicago, 98 S. Ct. 1231 (1978), while the employer characterized the issue as a
governmental intrusion into the adjudication of disputes between the lay faculty and the
religious employer, emphasizing the sectarian aspects of the schools. Respondent's Brief in
Opposition at 1-2, NLRB v. Bishop of Chicago, 98 S.Ct. 1231 (1978).
12. The accommodation used by the Board is best understood by contrasting its application in two situations. In Board of Jewish Educ., 210 N.L.R.B. 1037, 86 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1974),
the NLRB determined that the policy of the NLRA would not be furthered by asserting
jurisdiction over an employer tht provided religious training, stating: "[We do] not intend
...to adopt a policy of asserting jurisdiction over institutions primarily religious and noncommercial in character and purpose, whose educational endeavors are limited essentially to
furthering and nurturing their religious beliefs." Id.; accord, Association of Hebrew Teachers
of Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053, 86 L.R.R.M. 1249 (1974) (purpose of the NLRA
would not be furthered by asserting jurisdiction over an employer that operated a Jewish
College, after-school religious instruction to elementary and secondary school children, and
pre-school nursery classes). In Henry M. Hald High School Ass'n, 213 N.L.R.B. 415, 87
L.R.R.M. 1403 (1974), however, a parochial school was viewed as a substitute for public
school education, in contrast to being merely supplementary to secular schools. The Board
adopted the administrative law judge's finding that:
Neither the Act nor the United States Constitution declares that lay teachers
must surrender Sec. 7 [of the NLRA] rights [to organize and bargain collectively] if they become employed by a religious institution. Indeed Sec. 7 rights,
which are part of our national heritage established by Congress, were a legitimate exercise of Congress' constitutional power .... Any entanglement be-

tween the Hald Association and the government which is manifested in this case
was caused by the Hald Association when it hired lay teachers and. . . brought
itself under the jurisdiction of the Act.
213 N.L.R.B. at 418 n.7. See generally Comment, The Authority of Administrative Agencies
to Consider the Constitutionalityof Statutes, 90 HAxv. L. Rav. 1682 (1977). The view that a
parochial school may be a substitute for a broad-based secular education is in accord with
the sentiments expressed in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
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fringement upon an employer in an institution which is merely religiously affiliated. 3
The thesis of this Article, illustrated by reference to the Seventh
Circuit, is that the exercise of jurisdiction by the Board does not
intrude unconstitutionally upon those interests of the employer protected by the first amendment, regardless of whether the Board's
jurisdiction is challenged under that portion of the first amendment
prohibiting governmental establishment of religion or under the
first amendment's protection against governmental interference
with the free exercise of religion." The regulation of labor relations
in parochial institutions involves the administration of interests
which are separable from the interests protected by the first amendment. The establishment clause is concerned primarily with protecting against the advancement or inhibition of religious doctrine
and practice by government conduct. This objective is implemented
13. See Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 88 L.R.R.M. 1169
(1975); note 24 infra & accompanying text.
14. The court in Catholic Bishop of Chicago treated the free exercise and establishment
clauses of the first amendment jointly, stating that "there has been some blurring of sharply
honed differentiations" between the two clauses and that there were "substantial aspects in
the present case . . . not only of sovereign involvement in the religious activity under the
establishment clause but. . . also curtailment of the free exercise of religion ...
" 559 F.2d
at 1131.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the two religion clauses overlap, Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 , 448-49 (1971), but the Court also has acknowledged that both clauses
have a separate identity. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). This
view is not shared by Professor Kurland, who feels that the two clauses should be read
together "as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard
for action or inaction because these clauses, read together .. . , prohibit classification in
terms of religion either to confer a benefit or impose a burden." Kurland, Of Church and State
and The Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. Ray. 1, 96 (1961).
The opinion in Catholic Bishop of Chicago did note a "tension inevitably existing between
the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses." 559 F.2d at 1119; see Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Values, 77 YALE L.J. 692 (1968). This tension
arises from a comparison of the Supreme Court cases under the establishment clause, which
prohibit any aid to religion, see, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492-93 (1961); Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), with the Court's decisions under the free exercise
clause, which require that persons whose religious tenets conflict with governmental obligations be given exemptions not available to others. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
214-15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). See generally Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the "Establishment" and "Free Exercise"
Clauses, 42 TEx. L. REv. 142 (1963); Schwarz, supra. The Court has yet to examine this
conflict adequately. One scholar, however, has detected a trend in recent Court decisions to
elevate the free exercise concerns over those of establishment of religion. Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO.L.J. 1115 (1973).
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in labor relations through a religiously neutral legislative scheme
the enforcement of which does not cause undue entanglement in the
religious affairs of parochial schools. Free exercise claims require a
balancing of the secular interest in-achieving a legislative goal
against the resulting infringement upon the exercise of religious
belief. As the administrator of federal labor policy and legislation,
the Board is peculiarly capable of achieving this balance byfashioning workable guidelines sensitive to both secular and religious concerns. The Board and the courts have exhibited an ability to weigh
employee-employer interests generally and should be no less capable when one of the parties is a religious organization.
BOARD PROCEEDINGS IN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF CHICAGO

The Bishop of Chicago operates two parochial secondary schools
in Chicago, Illinois: Quigley North and Quigley South. Testimony
taken at the representation proceeding before the regional office of
the Board relating to the schools' academic and extracurricular programs, as well as their admission and vocational guidance programs, indicated that the institutions essentially are college preparatory schools. Although the employer contended that the schools
are "minor seminaries," the record indicated that very few of the
schools' graduates become Catholic priests. The majority of students enter public or private colleges; the remaining students obtain
secular employment. " Religion, taught as an academic subject, is
required for one period five days a week at Quigley North and for
one period three days a week at Quigley South. Religion classes are
taught only by priests; no lay teachers are involved directly. 6 As a
requisite to admission, a potential student must not only be qualified academically but also must submit evidence of his "potential
for Christian leadership, either as a priest or a layman.'" 7 Both
schools are subject to state laws concerning curriculum and attendance and are fully recognized by an accrediting agency of the state
as being "firmly based on a traditional secondary school program."'
In June of 1974, the Quigley Education Association, an affiliate
15. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 220 N.L.R.B. 359, 90 L.R.R.M. 1225 (1975).
16. Brief for Respondent at 8 n.7, Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th
Cir. 1977).
17. 559 F.2d at 1114 n.5.
18. Brief for Respondent at 8,Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th
Cir. 1977).
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of the Illinois Education Association, filed a representation petition
with the NLRB seeking to represent a bargaining unit composed of
the lay teachers at the two high schools. At the representation hearing" the employer contended that the Board should decline jurisdiction under the Board's own jurisdictional standard and that in any
event the first amendment prohibited the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over the schools. The Board rejected the employer's jurisdictional argument, finding that the schools operated primarily as college preparatory schools similar to those over which the Board had
theretofore asserted jurisdiction." The Board directed an election in
a single unit composed of all the lay faculty at both schools.2 1 The
19. Representation hearings are provided for by § 9(c)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §
159(c)(1) (1970) (as amended), which states in pertinent part:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed in accordance with such regulations
as may be prescribed by the Board(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor
organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of
employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that
their employer declines to recognize their representative ...
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe
that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an
appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an
officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing
that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret
ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
20. 220 N.L.R.B. at 359, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1225 (quoting Roman Catholic Archdiocese of
Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 250, 88 L.R.R.M. 1169, 1171 (1975)).
21. The Board defined the appropriate bargaining unit pursuant to § 9(b) of the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970) as:
All full-time and regular part-time lay teachers including physical education
teachers employed by the employer at the Quigley North and Quigley South
Schools, . . . excluding rectors, procurators, dean of studies, business manager,
director of student activities, director of formation, director of counseling services, office clerical employees, maintenance employees, cafeteria workers,
watchmen, librarians, nurses, all religious faculty, and all guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
220 N.L.R.B. at 360, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1227. For a discussion of the criteria employed by the
Board in determining the appropriate unit for bargaining, see ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELAIONS LAw, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 127 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
None of the parties in Catholic Bishop of Chicago objected to the exclusion of the religious
faculty from the unit of lay teachers. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972),
held that the application of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
2000(e) (1970), to the relationship between the Salvation Army and one of its officers, who
was a minister, would violate the first amendment protections of religious freedom. Similarly,
a decision by the Board to assert jurisdiction, contrary to the wishes of the church, over
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union won the election and was certified 2 by the Board as the exclusive representative of all forty-six lay faculty in the unit.
Following the employer's refusal to honor the union's request to
bargain collectively, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board. A complaint issued charging the employer with a
violation of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.2 In its answer, the employer admitted that it refused to bargain collectively
and again raised the objection that the Board had no jurisdiction
over the Quigley schools.
The Board granted the union's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the employer had violated the Act by refusing to bargain with the certified bargaining representative chosen by its employees. In reaching this decision the Board rejected the employer's
constitutional objection, stating that: 1) the purpose of the Act is
to maintain and facilitate the free flow of commerce through the
stabilization of labor relations; 2) the provisions of the Act do not
interfere with religious beliefs; and 3) regulation of labor relations
does not violate the first amendment when it involves a minimal
intrusion upon religious conduct and is necessary to obtain that
disputes between the church and its clergy or nuns arguably would run afoul of the first
amendment. Recognizing the constitutional concerns, the Board has been sensitive to this
problem and has determined to exclude religious faculty from a bargaining unit composed of
faculty members. Seton Hill College, 201 N.L.R.B. 1026, 82 L.R.R.M. 1434 (1973). There have
been instances, however, in which the employer or the employees have objected to the exclusion of religious faculty from the unit. Compare Nazereth Regional High School v. NLRB,
549 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1977) (exclusion of religious faculty affirmed) with NLRB v. Saint
Francis College, 562 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1977) (enforcement of bargaining order denied because
of employer's objection to exclusion of religious faculty). See generally, Comment, Bargaining

Status of Religious Faculty at Church-Affiliated Universities, 23 CATm. L. REv. 33 (1977).
22. Section 9(c)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970). For the text of this provision,
see note 19 supra. See also note 21 supra.

23. Section 8(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970), provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 [self-organization, collective bargaining, etc.]
of this title;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
Although § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), making it an unfair labor practice for an

employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization," was not in issue in either of the proceedings, the employer indicated this section in an effort to illustrate potential constitutional
intrusions which might result from the Board's assertion of jurisdiction. 559 F.2d at 1125.
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objective." The Board ordered the employer to cease and desist from
the unfair labor practices or from interfering with its employees'
statutory rights and required the employer to bargain with the
union.a
Similar proceedings involved the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South
Bend, Inc., which operates five parochial high schools in northeastern Indiana.2 1 These schools are similar to the Quigley schools except that they have a lower degree of religious orientation with no
non-academic limitations on admission as is the case in the Quigley
schools.Y The Board reached the same result with respect to a bargaining unit comprised of 182 lay faculty members.28
Upon petition for enforcement29 of its orders by the Board, the two
cases were consolidated by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. After hearing arguments the court held that the first
amendment barred the Board from asserting jurisdiction over the
parochial schools."
BASIS FOR THE BOARD'S ASSERTION OF JURISDICTION OVER PAROCHIAL
SCHOOLS

Absent a specific exemption in the National Labor Relations Act,
Congress has vested the Board with the fullest jurisdiction permissible under the commerce clause.3 1 The Act, however, does not require
24. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1222, 92 L.R.R.M. 1553, 1553
(1976) (citing Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 92 L.R.R.M. 1114 (1976)).
25. 224 N.L.R.B. at 1224.
26. 559 F.2d at 1114.
27. Id. at 1114 n.5.
28. Diocese of Fort Wayne - South Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 92 L.R.R.M. 1550 (1976).
29. The church-related employers petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
to review and set aside the Board's orders under § 10(f) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970)
(as amended). The Board cross-applied for enforcement of its orders under § 10(e), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e) (1970).
30. 559 F.2d at 1123-24, 1130.
31. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (per curiam). U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8 states in part that Congress shall have the power "Etlo regulate Commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes." The Court has
interpreted this clause as giving Congress broad legislative powers. In United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941), upholding the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 201-219), as a valid exercise of
congressional authority under the commerce power, the Court observed: "Whatever their
motive and purpose regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause." This
power is not unbridled, however; "the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably
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the Board to assert its jurisdiction to these permissible limits. Instead, the Board has statutory discretion to decline jurisdiction if,
in its opinion, the dispute's effect on interstate commerce is insubstantial.32
There is no exemption in the NLRA excluding parochial educational institutions from the Board's comprehensive jurisdiction. The
Board, however, sensitive to the constitutional controversy in applying the Act to parochial schools, has exercised its discretion to decline jurisdiction over, and therefore has refused to apply the Act to,
schools that are "completely religious," while exercising jurisdiction
over schools that merely are "religiously associated."' The Board
has found schools to be "completely religious" if they are devoted
exclusively to teaching religion or religious subjects as a supplement
to the secular education provided in the public schools.34 If instruction is not limited to religious subjects and the religiously associated
school seeks to provide a general education,3s albeit an education
adopted to the end permitted by the Constitution." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964).
32. The Board's discretion to decline jurisdiction over such schools is authorized by §
14(c)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
The Board, in its discretion, may by rule of decision or by published rules
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers,
where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction ....
See NLRB v. Carroll-Naslund Disposal, Inc., 359 F.2d 779, 780 (9th Cir. 1966), in which the
court stated:
The question is whether the Board has violated its own self-imposed jurisdictional standards. It is well settled that the extent to which the Board chooses
to exercise its statutory jurisdiction is a matter of administrative policy within
the Board's discretion . . . and is not a question for the courts . . . in the

absence of extraordinary circumstances, such as unjust discrimination.
Id. (citations omitted).
33. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 250, 88 L.R.R.M. 1169,
1171 (1975).
34. See, e.g., Association of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053,
1058, 86 L.R.R.M. 1249, 1251 (1974); Board of Jewish Educ., 210 N.L.R.B. 1037, 86 L.R.R.M.
1253, 1254 (1974). Jurisdiction in these cases was declined as much out of deference to first
amendment concerns as out of an absence of substantial effects on interstate commerce.
Analytically, it would be difficult to understand how "completely religious" schools in the
Chicago school system affect commerce any less than, for example, Ollie's Barbecue in Birmingham, Alabama. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
35. In its amicus brief before the Seventh Circuit in Catholic Bishopof Chicago, the Illinois
Education Association demonstrated that the Quigley schools were merely "religiously associated" by showing that the number of sectarian subjects and training was far outweighed
by the secular subjects taught. Brief for Intervenor at 8-14, 31-32, Catholic Bishop of Chicago
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grounded on religious principles, the Board will assert its jurisdic-

tion.36
Challenges to this exercise of the Board's jurisdictional discretion
fall into two related categories. First, accepting the validity and
constitutional appropriateness of a distinction between "completely
religious" and "religiously associated" schools, a parochial employer may urge that its school should have been found to be completely religious. Secondly, if the employer is found to have been
classified properly as "religiously associated" rather than
"completely religious," the employer may seek to challenge constitutionally the application of the Act to him, urging that any distinction which includes him within the purview of the Act's requirements is drawn too narrowly and results in an infringement of his
first amendment rights. Such a challenge has been viewed as either
a challenge of the Board's exercise of discretion or a challenge to the
application of the Act to any parochial institution. If this distinction
is merely an exercise of the Board's discretion, as with all such
exercises, it is reviewable judicially only for abuse of discretion, a
question of statutory rather than constitutional authority. Moreover, the employer may encounter substantial procedural obstacles
if his claim is framed as a challenge to the Board's exercise of discretion. A court may decline jurisdiction, citing the employer's failure
to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Thus, in Grutka v. Barbour,3' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court order enjoining the Board from administering representation election proceedings in the parochial
schools operated by the Diocese of Gary, Indiana, and from processing the union's unfair labor practice charge. The Catholic Bishop
had sought the injunction, arguing that the Board's assertion of
jurisdiction and the application of the NLRA to parochial schools
"chilled" the school's first amendment rights. Implicitly viewing
v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977). Neither employer disputed the secular functioning
of its schools in representation proceedings.

36. See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 88 L.R.R.M.
1169 (1975). This practice is consistent with the Board's long-established policy of asserting

jurisdiction over other nonprofit institutions that conduct commercial activities, even though
such activities help to support and further the institution's primary cultural, charitable, or

educational goals. See, e.g., The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 224 N.L.R.B. 718, 92
L.R.R.M. 1509 (1976); Catholic Charities of Buffalo, New York, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 9, 90
L.R.R.M. 1279 (1975); Port Arthur College, 92 N.L.R.B. 152, 27 L.R.R.M. 1055 (1950).
37. 549 F.2d 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977).
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the action as a "review" of a Board determination in a labor case,
rather than as a first amendment case, the court of appeals reversed
the district court's injunction and consigned the schools to the administrative remedies available under the Act. "Since the dimension of state-church entanglement can only be intelligently assessed
against a developed factual background," the court stated, "and
since developing a factual record in labor disputes is a task peculiarly within the competence of the Board," the court recognized
the importance here38 of "permitting the exhaustion doctrine to run
'
its normal course.
Thus, the court of appeals viewed the action as essentially an
inquiry into the degree of state entanglement in religious affairs, an
issue of law involving a factual determination which the court
viewed as committed by statute to the agency and subject to review
only in the court of appeals after exhausting agency procedures. The
Bishop's challenge was viewed as premature, since, if the union were
certified by the Board, the Bishop could refuse to bargain with the
union and test the validity of the Board's jurisdiction in the courts
in the context of an unfair labor practice trial. Any first amendment
challenge could be raised adequately in such a trial. The court held
that the mere allegation of constitutional objections did not confer
jurisdiction upon the district court to review otherwise unreviewable
"labor" determinations by the Board; 39 the statutory review procedures were found to be fully adequate to protect the school's constitutional rights." Presumably, the plaintiffs "remedy" is to ignore
the order to bargain, defend the enforcement of an unfair labor
practice charge, and test the validity of the Board's assertion of
jurisdiction in the court of appeals.
1 was less sympathetic to the
The decision in Caulfield v. Hirsch"
38. Id. at 9.
39. Section 10 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970), provides that the exclusive means of
obtaining judicial review of Board rulings by an aggrieved party is vested in the federal courts
of appeals.
40. 549 F.2d at 9.
41. 95 L.R.R.M. 3164 (E.D. Pa. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1328 (3d Cir. March 7,
1977). In Caulfield the employers contended that merely by asserting jurisdiction in order to
determine an appropriate unit for bargaining, the Board was encroaching upon its constitutionally protected religious freedoms. Id. at 3166. The Board had concluded that the appropriate unit for bargaining consisted of all full-time lay teachers in the 273 elementary schools in
the diocese of Philadelphia. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 227 N.L.R.B. 1178, 1181-82, 94
L.R.R.M. 1719, 1723 (1977). The employers objected to this determination on the grounds
that the individual elementary schools were sufficiently autonomous under church law to
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Board's administrative role. Disagreeing with the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of a similar challenge in Grutka, the court in
Caulfield characterized the case as involving "first amendment"
rather than "labor" issues 2 and enjoined the Board from completing
a representation determination.43 The court held that the impact on
religious freedom outweighed the government's interest in applying
the NLRA to Philadelphia's parochial school system, relying upon
what it termed a "sliding-scale test. '44 Justifying its assumption of
jurisdiction, the district court rejected the characterization made by
the court in Grutka and reasoned that it was not asked to review a
representation order or decision by the Board but rather was asked
to entertain a lawsuit filed to protect a constitutional right by premake it inappropriate for them to bargain as a multi-school bargaining unit and that the
creation of a lay bargaining unit would cause dissension between lay and religious members
of the faculty. Brief for Appellees at 7-9, 22-24, Caulfield v. Hirsch, No. 77-1328 (3d Cir.
March 7, 1977). As one commentator has noted, the first objection requires no examination
of church doctrine but would require the Board to accommodate the employer's religious
interests by accepting without dispute the ecclesiastical aspects and incorporating them into
its decision to reject a union claim for a multi-school bargaining unit. Comment, The Free
Exercise Clause, The NLRA, and ParochialSchool Teachers, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 645
(1978); see, e.g., Cardinal Timothy Manning, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1219, 92 L.R.R.M. 1114,
1116 (1976). The second objection, often raised by private employers contesting a multi-unit
determination, may be resolved without intruding upon church authority over religious teachers. In neither instance would the Board be making a determination concerning the internal
structure of the church's school system or contrary to the precepts of ecclesiastical authority;
rather, it would merely be considering a "secularly religious factor." See Giannella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development: Part IL The Nonestablishment
Principle, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513 (1968).
In Caulfield the employer should have been estopped from claiming that a lay teacher unit
would have a divisive effect since "[tihe Archdiocese of Philadelphia has been content since
1968 to bargain separately with its lay high school teachers," with no objection that such units
are religiously divisive nor with any showing of interference with religious freedom or authority relative to the religious faculty. Comment, The Free Exercise Clause, The NLRA, and
ParochialSchool Teachers, supra, at 646-67. Unlike Caulfield, there was no objection to the
composition of the unit in Catholic Bishop of Chicago.
42. 95 L.R.R.M. at 3167.
43. See id. Such orders, known as "Decisions and Direction of Election," have long been
held not to be "final" and thus are not reviewable in light of the case law interpreting § 10 of
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970). See AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409 (1940). The court in
Caulfield, however, applied both of the two known exceptions to this rule: the first being that
set forth in Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1945), allowing review of a Board order made
in derogation of its powers and violating a prohibition in the governing statute, and the second
being that stated in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10, 17 (1967), allowing review
where the interests involved are of such a critical nature as to provide a "uniquely compelling
justification for prompt judicial resolution of the controversy over the Board's power." 97
L.R.R.M. at 3167-68.
44. Id. at 3178-79.

1978]

PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

venting any application whatsoever of the NLRA to parochial

schools. 5

The plaintiffs do not seek review of a representation order but are
asserting a non-frivolous colorable constitutional claim. To deny
access to the federal courts and force plaintiffs to adjudicate their
first amendment contentions before an administrative agency
whose expertise lies only in labor matters cannot be justified in
the absence of a clear mandate from Congress.. . . Similarly, the
instant case is "not one to review . . . a'decision of the Board
made within its jurisdiction." It is one to restrain the order or
orders of the NLRB made contrary to the first amendment.
Kyne 6 may be read as standing for the proposition that where
plaintiff is not seeking review of an NLRB representation order
in the manner in which it would normally be reviewed by the
Court of Appeals in a § 10 case, but rather is seeking relief from
NLRB conduct which exceeds its statutory or constitutional
power, then district court jurisdiction lies."T
The court then held that, because the secular characteristics of
parochial schools are so intertwined with the schools' religious aspects, any application of the NLRA to the schools would violate the
first amendment.48
The infirmity of holding any assertion of jurisdiction over
parochial schools by the Board to be unconstitutional per se is
clearly demonstrated by analyzing the court's reasoning in Catholic
Bishop of Chicago. Relying upon recent Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutionality of state aid to parochial schools, 9 the
court in Catholic Bishop concluded that the Board's standard, distinguishing between "completely religious" schools and those which
are only "religiously associated," was a "simplistic black or white,
purported rule containing no borderline demarcation of where
45. 95 L.R.R.M. at 3164.
46. In Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958), the Court allowed a district court to enjoin
enforcement of "an order of the Board made in excess of its delegated powers and contrary
to a specific prohibition in the Act." In such a case, considerations of the Board's expertise
and the need for a fully developed factual record are irrelevant.
47. 95 L.R.R.M. at 3167-68 (quoting Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. at 188).
48. Id. at 3169-80.
49. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 748-54 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 366 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
767-68 (1973) (referring to parochial schools as "sectarian", "substantially religious",
"church-affiliated" or "religion-pervasive institutions").
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'completely religious' takes over or, on the other hand, ceases." '
Moreover, in applying this standard, the Board's approach was
characterized as a per se rule that Catholic secondary schools are
subject to the Board's jurisdiction5 1 and a "wooden adherence to a
jurisdictional standard of 'merely religiously associated' [meaning]
that simply because a school includes in its curriculum secular subjects it is thereby deprived of the protection of the Religion Clauses
in its recognized pursuit of the propagation of its religious faith.""
The parochial aid cases, the court noted, had held that the religious
purpose of parochial schools was so pervasive that it permeated even
the secular curriculum and other aspects of the schools, rendering
constitutionally meaningless any attempt to classify such schools as
completely religious or not completely religious. Thus, the Board's
standard was found to be inadequate to assure that assertion of
jurisdiction by the Board would not interfere with the parochial
schools' first amendment freedoms. Rather, the court concluded
that application of the standard merely avoided the issue of whether
the exercise of jurisdiction would have the effect of interfering with
religious beliefs or practices.53 The court then held that any assertion of jurisdiction by the Board over the parochial schools would
abridge the religious freedom guaranteed by the first amendment.
In reaching this conclusion, the court failed to differentiate between the threshold question whether the Board has the constitutional authority to assume initial jurisdiction over some parochial
schools by distinguishing "completely religious" schools from those
which are "religiously associated" and the analytically distinct
question of the permissible degree of Board involvement in the affairs of the school and matters of faith once jurisdiction is obtained.
Immediately questioning every assumption by the Board of jurisdiction over parochial schools precludes the Board from developing
standards by which the Board's jurisdiction extends only to those
administrative aspects of the school's operation that are purely secular and do not involve an unconstitutional infringement of the
employer's first amendment interests.
The problem is compounded by a confused reliance upon cases
concerned with state aid to parochial schools. For example, the
50.
51.
52.
53.

559 F.2d at 1118-19.
Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1120.
Id.
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employer in Catholic Bishop of Chicago relied upon the findings of
the Supreme Court in two parochial aid cases, Lemon v. Kurtzman"
5 5 to support its claim that parochial schools
and Meek v. Pittenger,
must be found to be "completely religious" and thus exempt from
the Board's jurisdiction. The Board's jurisdiction, however, was
based upon the secular activities and education provided in the
parochial schools and excluded an inquiry into the religious functions of the schools." Whether schools are "pervasively religious" for
purposes of determining the validity of state aid to the institution
is of questionable utility in examining the Board's findings for purposes of asserting jurisdiction. Nothing in the parochial aid decisions forbids the Board from deciding, under its own self-imposed
standard, whether the assertion of jurisdiction over parochial
schools would serve the purposes of the NLRA.5
54. 403 U.S. 602 (1971), in which the Court held unconstitutional a Rhode Island statute
supplementing the income of teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools,
finding that as to the sole beneficiaries of statute, the Roman Catholic elementary schools,
"[r]eligious authority necessarily pervades the school system."
55. 421 U.S. 349 (1975), in which the Court stated: -"The very purpose of many of those
schools is to provide an integrated secular and religious education; the teaching process is,
to a large extent, devoted t6 the inculcation of religious values and beliefs." Id. at 366.
56. This fact demonstrates the impropriety of confusing the issue of "entanglement" with
the issue of the Board's discretionary ability to assume or to decline jurisdiction, since the
parochial aid cases, including Lemon and Meek, emphasized the necessity of pervasive regulatory agency presence in the religious affairs of parochial schools in order to monitor the
allocation of public funds. The Supreme Court has not determined that parochial schools are
"completely religious" for purposes of assessing the Board's jurisdictional standard; it merely
has found that in the parochial schools involved in the cases before the Court the religious
aspect permeated all of the activities of these institutions, that the state aid programs at issue
could not constitutionally be limited to secular purposes without unduly entangling the state
in the administrative operation and the religious functioning of the schools. See, e.g., New
York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S 125, 132-33 (1977) (detailed audit by state of sectarian
school expenditures constitutes excessive entanglement).
57. Given the holdings in Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
908 (1977), and Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the Board should not be denied the flexibility to
amend or refine its standards in an effort to accommodate the religious purposes of parochial
schools. 559 F.2d at 1115. In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971) (plurality
opinion), the Court suggested that significant differences between the religious aspects of
church-related colleges and universities and the parochial elementary and secondary schools
affect the permissible degree of government entanglement in aid programs, indicating that
each circumstance may admit to a less than mechanical resolution. Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736, 760 (1973) (plurality opinion), emphasized the importance of administrative oversight in preventing unconstitutional encroachment. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding an FCC order and regulation promulgated under
the "fairness" doctrine to be both statutorily authorized and constitutional). A court should
not presume the Board incapable of being equally sensitive to the religious element arising
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There is, moreover, ample precedent for a standard which separates the secular from the religious functions of an institution for
purposes of administrative oversight." Nor does the Board's administrative determination involve the constitutional problem of state
evaluation of the religious content of a religious organization.59
Nothing in the Board's determination requires an interpretation of
any religious doctrine or dissection of any religious tenet; it merely
requires the Board to distinguish religious activities from secular
activities.
To argue that the Board's presence in the parochial schools creates an establishment issue and forecloses any administrative resolution of the problem, as the court did in Caulfield, is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's acknowledgement that some governmental involvement with religion is inevitable; 0 the real problem is to
determine the permissible degree of such involvement.' The mere
in a labor setting.
In Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305, 312 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974), the plaintiffs, political commentators, had been compelled
to join a union and submit to union discipline as a condition of employment, resulting in a
chilling effect on the exercise of their first amendment rights. The court of appeals construed
the NLRA to grant exclusive jurisdiction over the first amendment claim to the Board because the factual context in which the claim arose was "arguably" also an unfair labor
practice under § 8(a)(3) of the Act.
58. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (nonpublic colleges and universities);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (Selective Service Board conscientious objector
exemption); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemptions for church property).
Indeed, a distinction between the secular and the religious functions of sectarian schools was
the premise upon which some forms of state aid were upheld in Wolman v. Walters, 433 U.S.
229 (1977), a decision seen by some writers as retreating somewhat from the staunch insistence on separation of church and state. Comment, Wolman v. Walter and the Continuing
Debate over State Aid to ParochialSchools, 63 IOWA L. REv. 543 (1977). See generally Giannella, supra note 41.
Parochial schools have long been subject to a significant degree of state regulation which
presupposes a severance of the religious from the secular aspects and admits to substantial
control of the latter. See 37 OHIo ST. L.J. 299 (1976). Private schools are sufficiently public
in nature to be subject to extensive regulation in the interests of society. Matt & Edelstein,
Church, State, and Education: The Supreme Court and its Critics, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 535, 58384 (1973); see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
59. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971). See generally Giannella, supra note 41.
This clearly is not an instance of an administrative body "adjudicating the constitutionality
of congressional enactments." Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S.
233, 242 (Harlan, J., concurring), quoted in Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5, 8-9 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977).
60. 403 U.S. at 614.
61. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). Exemptions based on the distinctions
incorporated in the Board's discretionary standards for the assertion of jurisdiction are valid.
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act of applying a discretionary standard does not involve any undue
examination and entanglement in the religious affairs of the parochial schools. Rather, it is an administrative effort to prevent such
an impermissible degree of entanglement in the religious affairs of
the schools once the decision to exercise jurisdiction is implemented.
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION

Arguments that the first amendment bars the Board from assuming jurisdiction over parochial schools are based upon both the establishment and the free exercise clauses.2 An examination of these
arguments in the context of Catholic Bishop of Chicago clearly demonstrates their weakness.
Free Exercise
Elements of a Free Exercise Claim
Free exercise litigation has been concerned primarily with the
protection of individual rights.63 The purpose of the clause is to
preserve the notion of "voluntarism,"l or freedom of conscience in
beliefs and ideas. It is in this context that one must view any infringement upon the free exercise of religion in the parochial
schools. Controversies involving the free exercise clause follow two
distinct patterns to which the same analysis may be applied. A
governmental regulation may require an individual to perform an
act that his religion prohibits.65 Alternatively, a governmental reguSee note 58 & accompanying text supra. The creation of an "all or nothing" confrontation is

the least satisfying accommodation of the interests involved.
62. The opinion in Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 559 F.2d at 1131, made no distinction
between the two religion clauses; rather it combined its discussion of "free exercise" and
"establishment" principles because of its belief that there has been some "blurring of sharply
honed differentiations." See note 14 supra. See generally Warner, NLRB JurisdictionOver
ParochialSchools: Catholic Bishog of Chicago v. NLRB, 73 Nw. U.L. RaV. 463 (1978).
63. "The establishment clause obviously deals with entities, i.e., the state and religion (the
Church), whereas the free exercise clause apparently deals with persons, i.e., their personal
free exercise of religious beliefs and faiths . . . ." Forkosch, Religion, Education, and the
Constitution - A Middle Way, 23 Loy. L. Rv.617, 639 (1977). See generally Giannella,
Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I. The Religious
Liberty Guarantee,80 HARv. L. Rav. 1381 (1967).
64. Giannella, supra note 41, at 517.
65. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (objection to compulsory secondary
school education).
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lation may prohibit an action by an individual which he claims his
religious beliefs require him to perform.66
Regardless of whether a particular free exercise claim falls into
the first or second of these categories, certain elements must be
exstablished in order to prove a violation of the free exercise clause.
First, as stated by the Supreme Court, "it is necessary. . . for one
to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against
him in the practice of his religion.""7 In addition, the asserted constitutional injury cannot be speculative but must be "a demonstrable reality." 8 Compliance with the challenged governmental regulation must be directly contrary to the religious beliefs of the individual involved." .1 If such a genuine conflict exists, 9 the governmental
interests involved must be balanced against the degree of harm to
the individual's rights.70 Generally, if the challenged governmental
66. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (statute prohibiting minors from
selling magazines in street); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1964) (overturning application of drug statute to Indian peyote ritual).
67. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963), quoted in Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968). To a limited extent the requirement of some coercive effect,
unnecessary to an establishment claim, serves to distinguish the two clauses.
68. Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 558 (1962) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel.
McConn, 317 U.S. 269, 281 (1942)). As was stated in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S.
103, 132 (1937): "[The petitioner] seeks to bar all regulations by contending that regulation
in a situation not presented would be invalid. Courts deal with cases upon the basis of facts
disclosed, never with nonexistent and assumed circumstances." And in Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971), the Court declared: "A possibility always exists, of course, that the
legitimate objectives of any law or legislative program may be subverted by conscious design
or lax enforcement. . . . But judicial concern about these possibilities cannot, standing
alone, warrant striking down a statute as unconstitutional." Collective bargaining in the
parochial schools does not involve the kind of conflict between individual conscience and a
state interest typical of the free exercise cases decided by the courts. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago is quite unlike the situation in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), in which
compulsory school attendance would have struck a death knell to the Amish community. The
assertion of Board jurisdiction over parochial schools clearly does not conflict with religious
beliefs. Students, teachers, and administrators will continue to receive or transmit religious
beliefs and education even if they are subject to the NLRA. Collective bargaining has occurred in parochial schools without inhibiting the free exercise of religion.
68.1. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219-20 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403-04 (1963).
69. See generally Giannella, supra note 63, at 1423-31. For an example of the problem
involved in identifying a genuine conflict in a specific context, see United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78 (1944) (validity of religious beliefs questioned in mail fraud prosecution). For a
further discussion of the problem, see Note, Native Americans and the Free Exercise Clause,
28 HASTINGs L.J. 1509 (1977).
70. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 403, 406 (1963). See generally Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv.
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action regulates conduct rather than belief, such action is permissible if justified by a compelling state interest.7 1 The means of accomplishing such a compelling purpose, however, must be those which
72
least restrict the individual's first amendment rights.
L. REv. 327, 329-44 (1969); Giannella, supra note 63, at 1384, 1390-416.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940), the Court recognized that, although the freedom to believe is "absolute," all "[c]onduct remains subject to regulation
for the protection of society." In Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
the court applied this distinction to require an employer to bargain despite a claim that its
religious beliefs precluded it from dealing with a labor union. The court stated:
The Employers here are not required to abandon their religious belief that such
acts are wrong in order to engage in good faith collective bargaining. They could
still prove good faith bargaining if they had honestly attempted to come to some
workable agreement despite their belief that what they were doing was wrong
in a religious sense.
Id. at 889.
Similarly, the Board has determined that an activity may be both religious and commercial; the latter is not beyond the jurisdictional reach of NLRA. The First Church of Christ,
Scientist, 194 N.L.R.B. 1066, 1068-69, 79 L.R.R.M. 1135, 1138 (1972). In Motherhouse of the
Sisters of Charity, 232 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (1977), the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over
a nursing home associated with a convent. The Board found that the services provided by
the employer were non-commercial and were undertaken in the furtherance of religious objectives. The Board concluded that it would not serve the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction
in this situation. But see Rhode Island Catholic Orphan Asylum, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1976)
(non-commercial character not determinative).
71. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state interest in health of minor
outweighs free exercise claim). But see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ("Only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."), quoted in Sherbert v. Vetoer, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). See generally Forkosch, supra
note 63, at 639.
The dichotomy between governmental regulation of belief and of conduct, originally referred to in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879), seemed to have been abandoned in Sherbert. The Court, however, sounded a similar theme in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972), stating that "the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing
every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole
has important interests." See Comment, Racial Discriminationin Private Schools, Section
1981 and the Free Exercise of Religion: The SectarianLoophole of Runyon v. McCrary, 418
U. CoLo. L. REv. 419, 430-32 (1977). Some scholars have suggested that Yoder simply transferred the power to set standards for individual conduct from the government to the Church.
Kurland, The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education and the FirstAmendment's Religion
Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv., 213, 241-42 (1973); Riga, Yoder and Free Exercise, 6 J.L. & EDUC.
449, 466 (1977).
Recent collective bargaining decisions seem to recognize a belief-conduct dichotomy in
requiring bargaining despite a religious belief opposed to such conduct. NLRB v. Good Foods
Mfg. & Processing Corp., 492 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1974); Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424
F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
72. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607
(1961); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-05 (1940).
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Analysis of the Free Exercise Claim in CatholicBishop of Chicago
The controversy in Catholic Bishop of Chicago arose from the
Board's attempt to enforce its order requiring the parochial employers to bargain in good faith with the chosen representative of the lay
faculty of the schools. The primary defect in the constitutional
objection based on the free exercise clause in Catholic Bishop of
Chicago arises from the employers' failure to assert that the observance of the regulation in question would violate any of their religious
tenets." Although the parochial employers claimed that the first
amendment prohibits the government from requiring them to bargain collectively with a union representing their lay faculty, neither
employer contended that bargaining with a lay-faculty union was
contrary to their religious beliefs. 7 In order for conduct, or the abstention therefrom, to be protected by the free exercise clause it
must be established that such conduct or abstention is part of the
practice of religion. 5 Because the observance of the law by the par-6
7
ochial employers was not directly contrary to their religious beliefs,
73. The court will inquire whether the belief is of religious nature and therefore protected
by the free exercise clause or of a "philosophical or personal" nature and therefore unprotected. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). The courts will not examine the
veracity or theological validity of the religious belief, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407
(1963); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944), but will determine whether the
alleged belief is held in good faith. In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 228, 39 Cal. Rptr.
912 (1964); Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657 (D.C. 1963); In re Jenison, 267 Minn.
136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
74. The Catholic Church consistently has supported "the workers' natural right to enter
into association with his fellows" for the purpose of bargaining collectively with their employer and has acknowledged the obligation of the government "to protect the rights of all
its people, and particularly of its weaker members, the workers ....
Tm ENcYcICALs AND
OTHER MESSAGES OF POPE JOHN

XXII 255-56 (1964). Indeed, the Church supported passage

of the Labor Reform Act of 1977, regarded by most as pro-union in its orientation. See 123
CONG. REc. H10556 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Clay). See also Hearings on the
Labor Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8410 Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations
of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Seass. 411-23 (1977) (remarks of
Monsignor George C. Higgins). Recently, representatives of the Catholic Church joined several other church groups in signing a statement supporting a boycott of the J.P. Stevens
Textile Co., which was engaged with the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union
in a long-standing labor dispute over organization of its plant. See Catholic Leaders Urge
Boycott of J.P. Stevens Co., Wash. Post, Sept. 7, 1978, at A26, col. 6.
75. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
76. Id. In Yoder the Court stated: "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may
not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on
purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must
be rooted in religious belief." Id. at 215.

1978]

PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

the alleged conflict should not be viewed as a confrontation between
a fundamental constitutional freedom and a valid governmental
interest.
Even assuming arguendo that there is a good faith objection to
collective bargaining because it is contrary to religious beliefs,"7 the
religious importance of the objection must be balanced against any
relevant compelling state interest. Moreover, the regulation implementing those interests must be the least restrictive means of accomplishing the state's interest." Thus, if a statute is found to infringe upon the free exercise of an individual's religion, the extent
of that encroachment is measured against the state's interest in
enforcing the challenged regulation.
Religiously neutral, nondiscriminatory laws enacted for the general welfare must be observed even if such regulations incidentally
impinge upon the conduct of individuals in the practice of their
religion."9 This principle supports the imposition of collective barPrior to the decision in Yoder, courts had articulated a screening test to avoid spurious first
amendment claims. As was stated in United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 443 (D.D.C.
1968):
Those who seek the constitutional protections for their participation in an establishment of religion and freedom to practice its beliefs must not be permitted
the special freedoms this sanctuary may provide merely by adopting religious
nomenclature and cynically using it as a shield to protect them when participating in anti-social conduct that otherwise stands condemned.
In Kuch an examination of literature of the Neo-American Church revealed that the sole
reason for the group was the desire to use drugs, regardless of any religious belief, and,
therefore, the motivation for the conduct at issue was insufficient to invoke first amendment
safeguards. See Marshall v. Pacific Union Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, No. CV
75-3032-R (C.D. Cal. 1977) (equal pay provisions of Fair Labor Standard Act outweighed
religious objections of employer who operated several educational institutions). See generally
Note, Freedom of Religionas a Defense to a § 1981 Action Against a Racially Discriminatory
Private School, 53 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 107, 115-17 (1977).

77. See, e.g., Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
78. See notes 71-73 supra. The Board's decision to exempt schools that are completely
religious, as well as the decision to accommodate the religious employer by considering the
religious factors of its affiliation, represents a less restrictive alternative than exerting jurisdiction over all schools, regardless of their religious character or secular content. The distinction between "completely religious" and "religiously associated" for purposes of determining
the propriety of Board jurisdiction adequately serves the purposes of the Act. See 53 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 463, 468-69 (1978).

79. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing law enforced despite
economic burden on Orthodox Jews); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state
child labor law applicable to child selling religious literature); Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness
Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954) (failure to comply
with Fair Labor Standards Act not justified on religious grounds); Biklen v. Board of Educ.,
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gaining as a means of achieving harmonious labor relations despite
any tangential effect on the employer's free exercise of religion.'"
Finding that the requirement to bargain in good faith relates to
conduct rather than belief and does not unconstitutionally coerce or
infringe upon religious belief, the court in Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v.
NLRB5 ' declared that there is a compelling public interest in applying the good faith collective bargaining requirement uniformly to all
employees and labor unions.8 2 Thus, whether or not one considers
the NLRA to be directly contrary to a religious belief, application
of the Act to lay teachers in parochial schools may be justified under
the free exercise balancing test.
Moreover, the court's holding in Catholic Bishop of Chicago that
the order to bargain had an unconstitutional "coercive effect" upon
the employers' religious practices because of the potential restriction on the bishop's control over the parochial schools and the potential threat to the continued existence of the schools 3 rests on a
misconception of the actual functioning of the Board. The purpose
of the NLRA is to encourage collective bargaining without undue
governmental involvement. 4 Congress has emphasized that free
collective bargaining is in the national interest85 and that the terms
333 F. Supp. 902 (N.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 406 U.S. 951 (1972) (requirement that teachers
take oath does not violate free exercise clause).
80. See, e.g., Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974) (discharge
for refusal to pay union dues on religious grounds does not violate free exercise clause);
Linscott v. Miller Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971) (discharge
for failure to pay union dues upheld); Gray v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.
1970) (discharge for refusal to pay fees in lieu of union membership upheld); Ciba-Geigy Corp.
v. Local 2548, United Textile Workers, 391 F. Supp. 287 (D.R.I. 1975) (burden from Sunday
work on employee's free exercise of religion justified by public interest in collective bargaining).
81. 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see United States v. Kissinger, 250 F.2d 940 (3rd Cir.
1958), in which the court stated: "[T]he enforcement of a reasonably nondiscriminatory
regulation of conduct by governmental authority to preserve peace, trahquility and a sound
economic order does not violate the First Amendment merely because it may inhibit conduct
on the part of individuals which is sincerely claimed by them to be religiously motivated."
Id. at 943 (citations omitted).
82. 424 F.2d at 890; accord, Western Meat Packers, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 444, 57 L.R.R.M.
1028 (1964), enforcement denied on other grounds, 350 F.2d 804 (10th Cir. 1965) (employer
may not refuse to bargain with union on grounds of his religious beliefs). In NLRB v.
National Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952), the Court stated that the "[enforcement of the
obligation to bargain collectively is crucial to the statutory scheme."
83. 559 F.2d at 1123.
84. See R. SwiFr, THE NLRB AND MANAGEMENT DECISION MAKING 8 (1974).
85. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960); Textile Workers Union
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and conditions of employment must be determined by private contract" with minimal governmental intrusion.17 Within this legislative framework, the Board generally plays a positive role of facilitating collective bargaining. Only if the process malfunctions and the
public interest is undermined does the Board intervene to regulate
the conduct of the parties. 9 Thus, although the sharing of decisionmaking over wages, hours, and working conditions with employees
is inherent in the structure of collective bargaining, the actual substantive terms of the agreement are left entirely to the bargaining
parties.
An example, presented in another context by the court in Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, illustrates that the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Board over labor relations in parochial schools will not interfere with
the religious practices or beliefs of the employer. Assume that the
bishop refused to renew all lay faculty teaching contracts because
he believed that the training of Catholic students should be entrusted exclusively to the clergy." Under the case law developed by
the Board and the courts, the bishop probably would not be required
to bargain over that decision, if made in good faith.2
Such a situation is analogous to a total closingpf the employer's
enterprise in the private sector. 3 A distinction drawn in the case law
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452-54 (1957). See generally A. Cox, LAw AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR POLICY (Inst. of Indus. Relations Monograph No. 5, 1960).
86. Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective BargainingAgreement, 14 LAB.
L.J. 1016 (1963); see NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361'U.S. 477, 484-85 (1960);
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952).
87. Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations
Board, 63 HAav. L. REv. 389, 425-32 (1950). See also Wellington, supra note 86, at 1017; see
generally Walther, The Board's Place at the Bargaining Table, 28 LAB. L.J. 131 (1977).
88. This end is accomplished through representation proceedings and certification of an
appropriate bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
89. For example, the Board may intervene if there is evidence of employer or employee
discrimination on the basis of union activities, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3) and (b)(2), or a breach
of the duty to bargain in good faith on the part of either the employer or the union. 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (a)(5) and (b)(3).
90. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970)(the Board lacks authority to compel
agreement on substantive contractual provisions).
91. Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1977).
92. Any inquiry by the Board into the validity of such church doctrinal decisions is prohibited by Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
93. In view of the large number of lay faculty in the parochial schools, see note 8 supra, a
decision to refuse to renew all lay faculty contracts might best be analogized to a decision to
close the employers' business entirely. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg.
Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965) (total closing of union business is not an unfair labor practice
although motivated by anti-union animus).
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between bargaining over the decision not to renew the contracts and
the requirement to bargain in good faith over the impact of that
decision on the employees with regard to severance pay or possible
relocation of the employees defines the permissible limits of governmental interference with the employer's management prerogative in
such situations. 4 Under this distinction, the employer may be required to bargain with his employees over the effects of his managerial decision, but if the employer's decision effects a fundamental
change in the business' operating procedure, he cannot be required
to bargain with his employees over the substance of the decision
itself." If, however, the decision were motivated solely by anti-union
animus, the employer's decision would be subject to mandatory
collective bargaining. Because the decision to replace lay teachers
with clergy, or to close the schools entirely, would effect such a
fundamental change in operation, the schools could not be required
to bargain with the lay employees over this decision.
The requirement of impact bargaining reflects the belief that an
employer should provide for the welfare of his displaced employees;
but neither the union nor the Board can prevent the implementation of management's decision.17 By requiring the religious employer
to bargain over the impact but not the substance of its religiously
motivated decisions, the employer's religious interests are accommodated to the interests of his employees by providing a means
whereby the detriment suffered by the employees can be mitigated
without interfering with adjustments within the school based on
religious doctrine. 8
Thus, although the Board has authority to compel the parochial
employer to bargain with the lay employee's union concerning measures to mitigate the impact of its religiously motivated managerial
decisions, it has no authority to compel a party to agree on the
94. Morris, The Role of the NLRB and the Courts in the Collective BargainingProcess:A
Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom and UnconventionalRemedies, 30 VAND. L. Rav. 661,
671 (1977). Professor Morris suggests that the problem of bargaining requirements as to the
effects of managerial decisions is one of accommodation of the interests of the various parties.
95. NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Transmarine
Navigation Co., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967); Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479, 79
L.R.R.M. 1396 (1972), enforced, 474 F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1973).
96. Mobil Oil Corp., 219 N.L.R.B. 511, 90 L.R.R.M. 1075 (1975).
97. Swir, supra note 84, at 41-42.
98. Id. at 42.
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substantive terms of that decision.9" Compelling agreement when
the parties are unable to agree would be a violation of the fundamental premise of the Act: that the parties, and not the Board,
determine the terms of their agreement. The Board's position therefore is that the NLRA restricts only the employers' freedom to engage in unfair labor practices against lay teachers, a freedom which
enjoys no first amendment protection.100 ,
99. Section 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. V 19.75), provides in pertinent
part:
[To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual bbligations of the
employer and the representative of the employees to meet ht reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not
compel eitherparty, to agree to a proposalor require the making of a concession
Id. (emphasis supplied). This obligation has been held.not to conflict with any free exercise
value and has been satisfied by an honest effort between the partieg to reach some agreement.
Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cit. 1970). Sde also H.K. Porter Co. v.
NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); NLRB v. American Nat'l Is. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952). In
the latter case, the Court stated that "the Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel
concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 404.
100. Cap Santa Vue, Inc. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883, 889-.91 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Good Foods Mfg.
& Processing Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 418, 426-27, 79 L.R.R.M. 1387,1388-89 (1972), enforced,
492 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1974); see Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)
(freedom of press does not exempt employer from the Act); cf. Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness
Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879, 882-84 (7th Cir. 1954) (religion clauses do not exempt employer
from Fair Labor Standards Act).
Another argument propounded is that the Board's bargaining order threatens the continued
existence of the schools. This argument, however, is negated by the Supreme Court's decision
in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429 (1961), which held that an economic injury may
not necessarily be raised to the level of a constitutional. injury absent any tangible infringement of the plaintiff's religious freedom. See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-04
(1961) (indirect economic burden on exercise of religion outweighed by state's interest in
legitimate secular goals). Moreover, those parochial schools that have complied with orders
to bargain have experienced no infringement of free exercise rights and no economic collapse.
See note 9 supra. The policy considerations implicated by requiring collective bargaining in
the parochial schools resemble those raised in balancing governmental functions between the
state and federal governments. If one views the church and state as independent sovereigns,
the extent to which the federal government may regulate labor relations in church-related
schools may be determined by employing a balancing test similar to that used in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), to reconcile the power of Congress to legislate
under the commerce clause with the limitations on congressional power expressed in the tenth
amendment. In Usery the Court held that the challenged amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, "while undoubtedly within the scope of the Commerce Clause," id. at 841,
ran counter to concepts of federalism "insofar as the - . . amendments operate to directly
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Establishment Clause
Elements of an Establishment Clause Claim
The essential purpose of the establishment clause is to assure
government neutrality in matters of religion.'' The types of governmental intrusion excluded by the neutrality requirement were
stated succinctly by Justice Black in Everson v. Board of

Education:0o
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can
force nor influence a person to go or to remain away from church
against his will nor force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."'0 3
The Supreme Court has taken the view that the wall of separation
between church and state is not absolute; because some interaction
in church affairs is inevitable,0 4 the question in resolving establishdisplace the State's freedom to structure integral operations ...." Id. at 852. Under this
analysis, the absence of government control over the internal decision-making process of the
church, or of a significant economic impact on the church, militates against a determination
that the interests of the parochial school employers protected by the first amendment outweigh the congressional mandate of the NLRA.
101. Giannella, supra note 41, at 519. In Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that neutrality is the key concept governing the inevitable interaction between church and state. The plurality opinion written by Justice Blackmun
declared: "The State must confine itself to secular objectives, and neither advance nor
impede religious activity." Id. at 747. Additionally, the maintenance of neutrality may relieve
the inherent tension between the free exercise and establishment clauses. See note 14 supra;
note 197 infra & accompanying text.
102. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court held that the reimbursement of fares paid for transportation of children to Catholic school by public carrier does not violate the establishment clause.
103. Id. at 15-16 (citations omitted).
104. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), in which the Court reasoned: "Our prior
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ment clause challenges is not whether, but to what extent may such
interaction be tolerated.1 5 The process of determining the point
beyond which entanglement in church matters becomes excessive
presupposes an application of "neutral principles of law,""'0 a prohibition against an intrusion by the state into doctrinal matters,'0 and
a distinction in any given situation between the secular goals as
opposed to the religious interests. 8
In Tilton v. Richardson"' and Lemon v. Kurtzman"" the Court
developed a tripartite test to implement these considerations. A
failure to satisfy any one of the following criteria is sufficient to
invalidate governmental conduct on establishment grounds. First,
the purpose of the conduct must be the attainment of some legitimate secular interest. Second, the effect of the conduct must be
neutral, neither advancing nor inhibiting religion. Lastly, the conduct must not result in excessive governmental entanglement with
religion.
Analysis of the Establishment Clause Claim in Catholic Bishop
of Chicago
The establishment clause issue in Catholic Bishop of Chicago, as
in most cases,'' centered on parts two and three of this tripartite
test. The court's decision rested on the assumption that an unfair
holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not
possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable." Id. at 614 (citations omitted).
105. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (the question "is one of degree").
106. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
107. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Kedroff
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280
U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
108. See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 672-73 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968).
109. 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
110. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
111. Some decisions have rested on the first two elements of the test. In Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), a legislative program providing financial aid to private schools failed because it had the primary effect of advancing
religion and because it promoted excessive government entanglement with religion. Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), involved an infrequent instance of impermissible religious
purpose: the prohibition of the teaching of evolution in public schools. School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), held unconstitutional a law requiring Bible readings in public
school because it served to advance religion.
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labor practice proceeding under the Act might require an examination by the Board of religious doctrine and that in such circumstances the Board would be unable to accommodate its established procedure to the religious nature of the employer.12 The court accordingly held that the very exercise of jurisdiction by the Board interfered with religious beliefs or practices. 13 Since constitutional principles do not exist in a vacuum,"' the establishment objection cannot be analyzed without a consideration of the specific application
of the NLRA to parochial schools and the specific objections raised
by the employer.
The role of the Board in collective bargaining is uniquely conducive to assuring that the secular as well as the religious interests of
all concerned are protected."' Moreover, the legislative scheme of
the NLRA presupposes agency neutrality in matters of religion. Not
only is any intrusion into doctrinal matters precluded, but an examination of any religious tenet is unnecessary to resolve issues arising
in the context of labor relations. In one of the first cases construing
the NLRA, Associated Press v. NLRB, "6 the Court found that the
Board was required to and could very easily sever the nonconstitutional issues arising in an unfair labor practice proceeding
from those arising under the first amendment." 7 Regarding the freedom of the press, the Court declared:
The business of the Associated Press is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of the press. The publisher of a
newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and
112. 559 F.2d at 1127-30.
113. Id. at 1120, 1122.
114. See generally Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935).
115. Theoretically, lay teachers may claim that denial of the right to organize and bargain
collectively under the NLRA, either through an exemption or judical construction, inhibits
their free exercise by denying them the benefits of a general legislative provision solely
because of their affiliation with a religious institution. But see Robinson v. DiCenso, 400 U.S.
901 (1970) (lack of aid to parochial schools, resulting in school closings, does not violate the
first amendment).
116. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
117. "[It is said that any regulation protective of union activities, or the right collectively
to bargain on the part of such employees, is necessarily an invalid invasion of freedom of the
press. We think the contention not only has no relevance to the circumstances of the instant
case but is an unsound generalization." Id. at 131.
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liberties of others . . . . The regulation here in question has no
relation whatever to the impartial distribution of news."'8
The notion of severability is helpful in understanding that the
church will not surrender control in the management of the
parochial schools if they are required to bargain with a teachers'
union. Rather, the limitations inherent in enforcing the NLRA dictate that the church's control in managing the religious functions
of the schools remain absolute.
As previously stated," 9 the first step in the Board's decision
whether to assert jurisdiction over a religiously oriented school is to
determine whether such schools are "completely religious" or
merely "religiously affiliated." The court in Catholic Bishop of
Chicago held that recent Supreme Court cases dealing with state
aid to parochial schools described parochial schools as "permeated"
with religious purpose, a characterization inconsistent with a finding that such schools were merely "religiously affiliated.' 20 State
support of a religious organization, however, is quite distinct from
the uniform application by a government agency of religiously neutral regulations to all private employers. Thus, a slavish adherence
to characterizations of the nature of parochial schools for other purposes is unhelpful in the context of labor relations. In addition, the
discussion of the parochial aid cases in Catholic Bishop of Chicago
ignored the most crucial step in the analysis found in those cases:
whether the regulation, in this case the statutory requirement of
collective bargaining, requires "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance"' 2' of the sort found to be
unavoidable in the aid cases cited by the court.
The NLRA protects a wide class of employees and employers
against unfair practices arising out of the collective bargaining process. In Catholic Bishop of Chicago, application of the Act was
sought so that lay teachers, through the representative of their
choosing, would enjoy the recognitional and bargaining rights common to other employees. The exercise of these rights involves no
intrusion into religious principles, since the focus in resolving labor
disputes is on the secular functions of the institution.'12 Moreover,
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 132-33.
See note 33 supra & accompanying text.
559 F.2d at 1123-24.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619.
The Board's enforcement proceedings on behalf of the teachers can be analogized to
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the protection afforded by the Act is neutral with respect to the
religious freedoms guaranteed by the first amendment. It will assure
that the religious character of an employer is not itself sufficient
justification for the infringement of the employees' statutory rights
while also guaranteeing that the secular character of the employer's
activities is not sufficient justification to deprive the employer of the
ability to direct the enterprise, whether or not motivated by religious considerations.12s The protections afforded by the NLRA require no comprehensive, continuing regulatory surveillance; indeed,
such conduct is inimical to the intent of the legislative scheme. The
Board has no more concern with the religious prerogatives of the
church in maintaining the parochial schools than it does with the
ability of any other employer to direct his enterprise.
Requiring the religious employer to respond to an unfair labor
practice charge before the Board or a court involves no examination
of religious doctrine.2 4 Board proceedings are directed solely to determining whether an unfair labor practice has been committed.
Any inquiry by the Board necessarily is limited solely to the secular
issues of anti-union animus and fairness in collective bargaining and
is not concerned with the merits of any related dispute over religious
doctrine.rs As in the church property disputes, 2 1 the adjudication
proceedings in the judicial system to adjudicate disputes over church property. The Court
stated in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440 (1969):
Civil Courts do not inhibit free exercise merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without
"establishing" churches to which property is awarded .... [Tihe First
Amendment enjoins the employment of organs of government for essentially
religious purposes ....
Id. at 449.
123. As was noted in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937):
The act permits a discharge for any reason other than union activity or agitation
for collective bargaining with employees. . . .The petitioner is at liberty,
whenever the occasion may arise, to exercise its undoubted right to sever his
relationship for any cause that seems to it proper save only as a punishment for,
or discouragement of, such activities as the act declares permissible.
See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-44 (1954). The courts and the Board have
consistently reiterated that motivation is dispositive in finding a violation. See 48 B.U.L. REV.
142 (1968).
124. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
125. If a dispute requires a resolution of an underlying controversy over religious doctrine,
civil courts must accept ecclesiastical rulings as dispositive "where resolution of the disputes
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centers around neutral principles of law which do not inhibit or
intrude upon the protected religious freedoms of the litigant.
The limits of the Board's inquiry into labor disputes between
religious employers and their employees may be illustrated by examining the Board's role in evaluating charges that an employee
was improperly terminated. Analytically, the issues implicated by
a discharge motivated by religious doctrine, behind which lurks a
possible anti-union motive, are indistinguishable from those raised
by a discharge premised upon chronic absenteeism, insubordination, or disloyalty when the employee also happened to be affiliated
with a union. Each of these situations involves a so-called "mixedmotive discharge.""'2 In a hypothetical example raised by the court
in Catholic Bishop of Chicago,1 2s a member of the lay faculty of a
parochial school is dismissed by the bishop for advocating the morality of abortion and after he had become active in union affairs.
Clearly, if the bishop's motive for terminating the employee involved both religious doctrine and anti-union animus, the Board
might well compel the bishop to reinstate the teacher.' 21 It is a

cannot be made without extensive inquiry. . . into religious law and policy. . . ... Serbian
E. Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976); see note 107 supra.
126. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
127. Such discharges were discussed in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26
(1967). Whether the employer's conduct results in severe or slight harm to employee rights
under the Act, the employer bears the burden of proving a legitimate and substantial business
justification for its conduct. Id. at 34. If the harm to employee rights is slight and the
employer has shown a business justification, independent evidence of an anti-union motive
must be proven to establish a violation of § 8(a)(3). Id. If the employer's conduct was
"inherently destructive" of employee rights, then, despite an employer's showing of a substantial and legitimate business justification, a violation of § 8(a)(3) of the Act may be found
if the Board determines that the policy of preserving employee rights outweighs the legitimate
business end served. Id. at 33-34; see Janofsky, New Concepts in Interference and Discrimination Under the NLRA: The Legacy of American Shipbuilding and Great Dane Trailers, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 81 (1970); Comment, Employer DiscriminationUnder Section 8(a)(3), 5 U.
TOL. L. Rav. 722 (1974).
128. 559 F.2d at 1124.
129. See, e.g., Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1352-53 (3d Cir. 1969)
(employer cannot substitute "good" reason for the "real" reason when the purpose is retaliation against an employee's protected activities). See generally Cox, Some Aspects of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1947), in which Professor Cox
states:
The reason the employer's motive is decisive is plain. Imposed legal duties are
usually a compromise between conflicting interests, the aggressor being privileged to invade the victim's interest to protect his own, so far as the law recognizes it. Hence, when the aggressor is not actuated by a desire to protect a
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mistake, however, to assume that the bishop could not dismiss such
an employee if the motive were genuinely religious and not a mere
pretext. This situation often is resolved by balancing the employer's
managerial rights against the inhibiting effect such conduct might
3
have on the organizational rights of other employees.' 1
Emphasizing the importance of employer motivation, the courts
often have referred to those rights of the employer which were not
intended to be compromised. Even if the effect of the employer's
conduct is to discourage union participation, there is no violation
in the absence of the proscribed motive. 3 In NLRB v. Jones &
recognized interest, the basis for his excuse disappears. This philosophy is
embedded in Section 8(3). If an employer discharges an employee to protect his
interest in building up an efficient working force, he does not commit an unfair
labor practice, even though the discharged employee is a union leader and
organization is thereby set back. On the other hand, if the employer's action
springs from a desire to discourage organization, the privilege is lost and the
discharge is unlawful.
Id. at 20-21.
Employer knowledge of an employee's union activity is probably the most important element in determining whether the dismissal was for impermissible "secular" motives. NLRB
v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 868 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Atlanta
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 293 F.2d 300, 309 (5th Cir. 1961); see Retail Store Employees' Union,
Local 876, 212 N.L.R.B. 113, 87 L.R.R.M. 1251 (1974) (citing Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,
208 N.L.R.B. 356, 85 L.R.R.M. 1082 (1974)) (no unlawful purpose demonstrated when there
is no evidence that discharged employee engaged in concerted activities and thus employer
could not know of adherence to the union); Shieber & Moore, Section 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act: A Rationale-PartII. Encouragement or Discouragementof Membership In Any Labor OrganizationAnd the Significance of Employer Motive, 33 LA. L. REv. 1
(1972).
130. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967); NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963). Historically, this balancing has been a function
of the Board in resolving unfair labor practices. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353
U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
131. The law allows any employer to replace any employee for any reason whatsoever,
excepting only his union membership or legitimate union activity. Indiana Metal Prod. v.
NLRB, 202 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 1953). In NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th
Cir. 1946), the court declared:
In considering the propriety of these discharges the question is not whether they
were merited or unmerited, just or unjust, nor whether as disciplinary measures
they were mild or drastic. These are matters to be determined by the management, the jurisdiction of the Board being limited to whether or not the discharges were for union activities or affiliations of the employee.
Id. at 490. Thus the Board is not concerned if the dismissal was for good cause, much less if
it was for a religious reason. The employee clearly is not protected by the Act for conduct
that violates the religious tenets of the parochial schools, just as an employee is not insulated
from reasonable discipline merely because of his union affiliation. H.L. Meyer Co. v. NLRB,
426 F.2d 1090, 1094 (8th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Div., 413 F.2d 457, 458 (4th Cir.
1969).
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Laughlin Steel Corp.,3 the Supreme Court elaborated upon the
purpose of section 8(a)(3) and delineated the role of the NLRB:
The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right
of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them. The
employer may-not, under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce
its employees with respect to their self-organization and representation, and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to make
its authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge
when the right is exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion. The true purpose is the subject of the investigation with full opportunity to show the facts. 11
Clearly, therefore, the religious employer is not at all inhibited in
the structuring and management of the parochial schools, if motivated by religious considerations. 34
Applying the rule in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967), to the
discharge on grounds of religious doctrine of a lay teacher actively supporting the union, the
Board first would determine whether the discharge was "inherently destructive" of the employee's organizational rights. Assuming the employer's action is so characterized by the
Board, the employer then has the burden of showing a substantial and legitimate business
reason for the discharge, in this case the religious doctrine, the validity of which cannot be
challenged by the Board. See notes 107 & 125 supra. The Board must then "exercise its duty
to strike the proper balance between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of
employee rights in light of the Act and its policy." 388 U.S. at 33-34. Absent proof of antiunion animus, the constitutional right of free exercise of religion would justify the effect of
the discharge on the employee's exercise of his statutory rights; thus, the employer would not
be found guilty of violating § 8(a)(3) of the Act. The Board, therefore, can accommodate the
religious employer's interest merely by applying the rule that anti-union animus is a prerequisite for a § 8(a)(3) violation. NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F.2d 45, 49-50 (9th Cir.
1970); Southwest Latex Corp. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 50, 54-55 (5th Cir. 1970); Nix v. NLRB,
418 F.2d 1001, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969).
132. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
133. Id. at 45-46.
134. In American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), the Court stated:
[W]e have consistently construed the section to leave unscathed a wide range
of employer actions taken to serve legitimate business interests in some significant fashion, even though the acts committed may tend to discourage union
membership ....

Such a construction is essential if due protection is to be

accorded to the employer's right to manage his enterprise.
Id. at 311 (citations omitted). That a religious motive is legitimate, substantial, and not
subject to scrutiny is clear. If a teacher advocated principles contrary to church doctrine, this
would constitute a separate identifiable reason for discharge. Since in such a situation it could
not be claimed that but for the employee's union activities he would not have been discharged, the Board should find no violation of § 8(a)(3).
The Board has applied the "but for" test in the context of parochial schools with no
indication of religious infringement or compulsion to retain an unsatisfactory employee. In
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 222 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1056-57, 91 L.R.R.M. 1419, 1425-
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The absence of intrusion or entanglement in religious affairs also
is evident when one considers the possibility of a mixed-motive
discharge being resolved through arbitration, long an accepted
forum for dispute resolution in labor relations. The preference for
voluntary resolution of disputes between the parties involved, expressed both legislatively and judicially,"' has led to a widespread
inclusion of grievance arbitration mechanisms in labor contracts as
135.
a means of resolving differences between labor and management.
Because voluntary referral of disputes to arbitration allows for private dispute resolution with minimal governmental involvement,
the entanglement issue is avoided.
The Supreme Court has determined that the function of a court
in reviewing the arbitrability of disputes is a limited one. 136 A court
26 (1976), a teacher was not rehired after a period of involvement in intense union activity.
Although the record indicated a number of privileged religious reasons why the teacher was
not rehired, the employer failed to act at the time those reasons first arose. The teacher had
been rehired once before, and it was only after the teacher's union activity became visible
that the decision not to rehire him a second time was made. The union activity, therefore,
played the decisive role in the decision not to rehire. See Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
138 F.2d 86, 90-91 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944) (§ 8(a)(3) violation found where
employee involved in union activities was discharged after having been retained prior to such
activity despite derelictions in duty). See generally Comment, The Free Exercise Clause, The
NLRA, And ParochialSchool Teachers, supra note 41, at 657.
In a number of cases the courts have found that the conduct of an employee was so improper
that discharge was justified in spite of the fact that he also was engaged in protected activities. E.g., Cain's Coffee Co. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (10th Cir. 1968) (poor sales
record, antagonization of customers, retention of second job); NLRB v. Red Top Cab &
Baggage Co., 383 F.2d 547, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1967) (flagrant violations of company regulations);
Southern Oxygen Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 738, 742 (4th Cir. 1954) (violation of regulations,
abusive language, insubordination).
135. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970), which deals with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, states in pertinent part: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties
is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." In Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), the Supreme Court noted that it is "the
basic policy of national labor legislation to promote the arbitral process as a substitute for
economic warfare." Id. at 105; see United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582 (Congressional policy favors resolution of disputes by arbitration).
135.1. In 1966, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that 94% of collective bargaining agreements provided for arbitration as the final step in a grievance procedure. U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-6, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: ARBITRATION PROCEDURES (1966). Provision for arbitration of contract
negotiation disputes, however, occurred in only two percent of all collective agreements. Id.
at 95.
136. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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need merely ascertain whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the terms of the contract. It may not weigh the merits of the grievance; 137 these questions
are reserved to the arbitrator. This kind of limited court involvement is far from the "prophylactic contacts required to ensure that
lay teachers play a strictly nonideological role . . [which] necessarily give rise to a constitutionally intolerable degree of entanglement between church and state,"13' 8 attacked in the parochial aid
cases.
The Board likewise has stated that it will not disturb arbitration
awards if the proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, the
parties agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's decision, and the
arbitrator's decision is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and
policies of the NLRA. 39 This notion of abstention, nonreviewability, and non-involvement in the arbitration process has
been extended to the arbitral resolution of unfair labor practice
cases. 4 '
137. 363 U.S. at 567-68. See generallyAaron, ArbitrationIn the Federal Courts:Aftermath
of The Trilogy, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 360 (1962).
138. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369 (1975) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
619 (1971)). In a recent address at the University Miami Law School, Mr. Justice Rehnquist
compared the role of the courts in reviewing arbitration decisions with the Milivojevich
decision, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), which bars a court from resolving church factional disputes.
Justice Rehnquist indicated that labor unions as an institution, and as collective bargaining
agents, are subject to less "adversary exploration" in the courts than are other economic
institutions. Rehnquist Would Limit Availability of Courts ForIndividuals' Claims, Wash.
Post, Feb. 14, 1978, at A6,col. 1.
139. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152, 1153 (1955). The
Spielberg doctrine has been applied when the parties have not exhausted their contractual
rights and remedies. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 841, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1936
(1971) (quoting Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 12 L.R.R.M. 44 (1943),
enforced in part, 141 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1944)).
140. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 841, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1936 (1971). Such
arbitration awards will not be honored if it is determined that the arbitrator did not consider
the issue brought before the Board. Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 884-85, 52 L.R.R.M.
1129, 1130-31 (1963); Monsanto Chem.Co., 130.N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451, 1452
(1961). See generally Murphy & Sterlacci, A Review of The NationalLaborRelations Board's
Deferral Policy,42 FoRDHAM L. REv. 291 (1973). In this regard, the Board's policy consciously
parallels the Supreme Court decisions mandating that courts give specific performance to
agreements for grievance arbitration. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957); see Meltzer, The Supreme Court,Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining,28 U. Cm.
L. REv. 419 (1961).
It is unclear why the Board may not promulgate similar workable guidelines for dealing
with an unfair labor practice dispute involving both secular and religious overtones. Such
guidelines would make it clear that the religious doctrine is not to be examined in resolving
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The value of arbitration in the context of labor relations in parochial schools is evident. Not only does arbitration have the therapeutic effect of ensuring that "there is room for play in the joints
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious
exercise without sponsorship and without interference,"", but arbitration is particularly helpful because labor arbitrators are experienced and skilled in resolving matters peculiar to the established
collective bargaining relationship. Arbitrators, although limited to
construing the literal terms of the contract,' offer a unique expertise' and are able to fashion an "industrial common law of the
shop""' particularly suited to resolving labor contract disputes
without the intervention of any governmental entity. Thus, arbitration will result in an equitable sensitivity to the interests of the
parties without causing wholesale entanglement.
Returning to the mixed-motive discharge hypothetical, submission of such an issue to an arbitration panel selected by the employer and the union does not require the sort of state involvement
condemned in the parochial aid cases. Because the arbitration process assures complete neutrality and non-intervention by both the
courts and the Board, the religious employer cannot claim that the
exercise of his first amendment rights is inhibited, or "chilled," as
a result of the submission of secular labor disputes to an arbitration
panel. Like any other private employer, the church is asked merely
to conform its conduct, as an employer, to the secular prohibitions
of a statute serving a legitimate public interest.'
the dispute. Stripping the Board of jurisdiction over such cases is not a constructive means
of protecting the employer's religious interests and totally overlooks the interests of a substantial number of employees.
141. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 669.
142. See generally F. ELKOU= & E. ELKOUm, How AitrrRATiON WORKS 44-67 (3d ed. 1973).
143. In the case of arbitration involving lay teachers in the parochial schools, the parties
might find it desirable to choose the arbitration panel from teachers, educators, labor experts,
and clergy. It has been continually emphasized that "[a]rbitration is a tool of industrial selfgovernment for unions and companies. It should be developed by them to meet their needs."
Taylor, The Effectuation of ArbitrationBy Collective Bargaining,in CmTIcAL IssuEs IN LABOR
ARBrrRATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS

151, 155 (J. McKelvey ed. 1957). In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960), the Supreme Court stated that arbitrators were free to base their decision not only
upon the contract itself but also upon their personal knowledge of the "common law of the
shop."
144. D. CHANIN & R. WoLLETr, THE LAW AND PRACTIcE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS 5:39-40
(1974).
145. The court in Catholic Bishop of Chicago compared the chilling effect of mandatory
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In a less frequently encountered context, arbitration may be helpful in resolving disputes over the substantive provisions of the contract, such as determining a fair pay increase when the parties reach
an impasse. In parochial schools this might be extended to the arbitration of disputes concerning management rights or the arbitration
of other substantive issues arising during the course of negotiations.
In neither instance is a decision to arbitrate a usurpation of the
religious employer's right to manage his enterprise as he deems
proper; rather, it is a voluntary agreement by the parties to submit
a carefully circumscribed situation, likely to occur in the administration or negotiation of the contract, to a panel of their choosing. "6
Although the religious employer, as any other employer, may question the utility of agreeing to submit a management rights dispute
to arbitration, this provides an important alternative to employers
who are fearful of Board decisions, interpreted by them as restricting management rights, and who desire a more meticulous weighing
of equities.'47 There is no reason to believe that the parties to the
agreement would be unable to distinguish between secular objectives subject to arbitration and subjects that involve either educational policy or religious considerations and therefore should be excluded from arbitration. Nor can a decision to permit an arbitration
bargaining on the bishop's control of the schools to the effect on free speech of a loyalty oath
requirement for a tax exemption, which was struck down in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513
(1958). In Speiser, however, the requirement placed the burden of proof of lawful conduct on
the individual, creating the possibility that a mistake in the fact-fiMding process would result
in the penalization of a legitimate utterance. Id. at 526. In the area of labor relations, the
Board has the burden of proving a violation of the Act. The court in CatholicBishop, however,
found a chilling effect arising from "the risk of protracted and expensive unfair labor practice
proceedings before the Board which would certainly involve the Church's religious policies
and beliefs." 559 F.2d at 1124. In fact, such proceedings need not be expensive or protracted,
particularly if the parties have agreed to arbitrate grievances, and the Board will be prohibited from examining the validity of religious beliefs.
146. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOUM, supra note 142, at 505-58.
147. This can be accomplished by including within the contract provisions an express
reservation of management rights. See F. ELKOUmi & E. ELKOUin, supra note 142, at 432-34.
Since arbitrators generally feel bound by the terms of the contract, the employers' position
before the arbitrator is strengthened by the inclusion of a management rights clause. Id. at
434 (citing National Cash Register Co., 46 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. (BNA) 317, 320 (1966)).
Because an arbitrator is not authorized to go beyond the language of the contract, the presumption in favor of the arbitrability of disputes and the Board's policy of deferral to arbitration may be suspended due to language in the agreement excluding a management subject,
where such exclusion is in derogation of the policy of the Act. See Ordman, The Arbitrator
and the NLRB, in THE ARBrrRATOR, THE NLRB AND THE CouRTs 47 (BNA 1967), quoted in F.
ELKOURI & E. ELKOUPI, supra note 142, at 427.
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panel to determine whether a particular dispute is subject to arbitration under the agreement be equated with the kind of governmental action that results in the infringement of constitutionally
protected interests.
Arbitrational decision-making involves none of the excessive intrusion or surveillance found to exist in administering some of the
parochial aid programs. For example, in the hypothetical discussed
previously, in which the bishop decides to replace the lay faculty
with clergy for religious reasons, the arbitration panel could make
one of several determinations that would not infringe upon the religious employer's exclusive right to take such action. This decision
could be viewed as an exercise of management's prerogative rights
either not subject to arbitration at all or not a proper subject for
bargaining. Alternatively, the decision may be viewed as a permissive subject of bargaining requiring discussion over impact, similar
to a secular management prerogative subject to impact bargaining.
Any determination, however, that the bishop's decision is itself subject to mandatory bargaining would be unenforceable either under
clear guidelines developed by the Board as administrator of the Act
or by the courts. Such a determination would be repugnant to the
Act because it unconstitutionally involves an interpretation of underlying religious doctrine;"' the Board could at most direct impact
bargaining. Alternatively, such an award by the arbitrators would
not be enforceable in court"' either because the arbitrator had ex148. The Board will not defer to an award that does not correspond to the principles and
policy of the Act. E.g., Sheet Metal Workers, Local 17, 199 N.L.R.B. 166, 81 L.R.R.M. 1195
(1972) (contract provisions discordant with criteria under the Act); Hershey Chocolate Corp.,
129 N.L.R.B. 1052, 47 L.R.R.M. 1130 (1960) (contract clause illegal).
The NLRB has announced in no uncertain terms what its procedure would be in resolving
labor disputes involving a religious employer. In the Brief for Appellant at 11, Caulfield v.
Hirsch, appeal docketed, No. 77-1328 (3d Cir. March 7, 1977), the Regional Director maintained:
The Board may decide, in the proper case and upon a proper factual back-

ground, whether bargaining on a particular subject is mandatory, permissible,
or impermissible, and in so doing may take into account the peculiar circumstances of an employer's operations, and may protect the employer from a
union's attempt to compel bargaining regarding an improper subject.
This accommodation applies equally to unfair labor practice charges if the employer is warranted in disciplining an employee.
149. If the arbitration involves both a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and
an unfair labor practice, the authority of the courts to enforce the labor agreement under §
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), and the authority of

the Board to hear the unfair labor practice charge is concurrent. Smith v. Evening News
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ceeded his grant of authority, because the award is repugnant to the
Act, or simply because enforcement of the award would be unconstitutional. In contrast, any award requiring impact bargaining causes
no constitutional injury since the employer's original decision to
replace the lay teachers is preserved.
The opinion in Catholic Bishop of Chicago raised other serious
objections to requiring parochial schools to bargain in good faith
with lay teachers. 5 ' The central issue underlying these objections is
whether management of the schools is to be vested in the administrators or in the teachers.' 5' It is incorrect, however, to assume that
once a union is recognized the employer has forever surrendered all
ability to control the destiny of his enterprise. The requirement to
bargain in good faith over wages, hours, and the terms and conditions of employment admittedly is rather broad. However, the religious policy of the parochial schools clearly falls outside the mandate of required bargaining; neither the Board nor the courts have
authority to compel the parties to agree to substantive terms.
The precise scope of the bargaining requirement has been subject
to judicial and administrative construction. In NLRB v. Wooster
Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,'52 the Supreme Court recognized
three distinct categories of subjects amenable to bargaining, each
with its own requirements. The first of these categories includes
Ass'n., 371 U.S. 195 (1962). If, however, the Board and the arbitrator should disagree, "the
Board's ruling would, of course, take precedence; and if the employer's action had been in
accord with that ruling, it would not be liable for damages under § 301." Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964). Similarly, the courts will not enforce arbitration
awards requiring an illegal act. Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers, Local 753, 422
F.2d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 1970) (labor agreement violates antitrust laws); see Local 115, Nursing
Home Union v. Hialeah Convalescent Home, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (recognizing principle but holding public policy not vitiated by enforcement). See generally Note,
Judicial Enforcement of Labor Arbitrator'sAwards, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1050 (1966);
Symposium, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Role of Public Policy, 58 Nw. U. L. Rxv.
545 (1963). The employer also can prohibit the arbitrator from examining decisions premised
on good faith religious beliefs by specifically excluding disputes based on such decisions from
the general arbitration clause when the agreement is negotiated.
150. The court, quoting from Brown, Collective BargainingIn Higher Education, 67 MICH.
L. Rav. 1067, 1075 (1969), agreed with management's view that the mere obligation to recognize and bargain with employees will result in the "transmutation of academic policy into
employment terms. . . ." 559 F.2d at 1123.
151. See C. PERRY & W. WLDMAN, THE IMPACr OF NEGOTIATIONS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: THE
EVIDENCE FRoM THE SCHOOLS 168-71 (1970) (tending to demonstrate that this concern has no

factual basis). See generally Comment, Control of EducationalDecision-Making, 74 MICH.
L. REv. 1485 (1976).

152. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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demands made by either party that would be illegal and prohibited under the NLRA, such as a closed shop. Bargaining over these
illegal subjects may not be required; nor may such terms be included in the collective bargaining contract even if the other party
agrees.'53 The second category encompasses the mandatory subjects
of bargaining found in section 8(d) of the Act,'54 over which the
parties must bargain in good faith. The party proposing discussion
of one of these subjects, such as salaries, fringe benefits, or grievance
procedures, may insist on its inclusion in the final contract even if
this results in an impasse in the negotiations.'55 Finally, there are
demands which are characterized as voluntary or permissive subjects of bargaining. These are demands that fall outside the mandatory category of wages, hours, and conditions of employment. They
may be proposed for inclusion in the contract, but the other party
is not required to bargain concerning them or to agree to their inclusion in the contract. Insistence on inclusion of such terms as a condition to the execution of the contract may result in a violation of that
party's obligation to bargain in good faith.' 6
The Borg-Warner framework has been applied in resolving management objections in public education in those states that have
mandated collective bargaining in the public schools, a situation
153. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). See NLRB v. National Maritime Union, 175 F.2d
686 (2d Cir. 1949). The majority limited its discussion in Borg-Warnerto lawful subjects of
bargaining, distinguishing between those that are permissive and those that are mandatory.
A demand for a change of a parochial school policy based on religious doctrine could be
construed as an illegal subject of bargaining on constitutional grounds.
154. See note 99 supra.
155. 356 U.S. at 349. The term "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" found in § 8(d) has been interpreted to include profitsharing plans, Dickten & Mosch
Mfg., 129 N.L.R.B. 112, 46 L.R.R.M. 1516 (1960); plant rules, Miller Brewing Co., 166
N.L.R.B. 90, 65 L.R.R.M. 1649 (1967); and grievance procedures, Crown Coach Co., 155
N.L.R.B. 625, 60 L.R.R.M. 1366 (1965). See generally Clark, The Scope of the Duty to
BargainIn Public Employment, in LABOR RELATIONS LAW INTHE PUBLIC SECTOR 81 (A. Knapp
ed. 1977).
In Mayes Bros., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 181, 54 L.R.R.M. 1327 (1963), the Board held that the
employer did not violate his bargaining duty when he insisted upon excluding discharge,
discipline, and grievance procedures from arbitration. The Board found that the employer
was willing to discuss the discharge and discipline cases through the grievance procedure and
only insisted upon not arbitrating them.
156. 356 U.S. at 349. Permissive subjects for bargaining include the posting of performance
bonds by the parties, Benson Produce Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 888, 19 L.R.R.M. 1060 (1944); internal
union affairs, Houchens Mkt. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1967); and use of a union label,
Kit Mfg. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 662, 32 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1964), enforced, 365 F.2d 829 (9th Cir.
1966).
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analogous to that faced by parochial school employers.157 The issues
raised in these cases, typically curriculum, quality of education, and
other matters of basic educational policy, have been held not to be
subject to mandatory bargaining in the public schools.' 8 Just as the
employer has an unassailable prerogative in managing its enterprise
in the private sector, the religious employer need only bargain over
such issues if it voluntarily chooses to do so. Because these subjects
are merely permissive, the bishop can at any time unilaterally remove these subjects from the bargaining table without fear of any
administrative or judicial ramifications, just as he can refuse to
discuss them altogether.'59 Thus, for example, if the bishop decides
157. Although the NLRA does not apply to any state or political subdivision, judicial
decisions under the Act have been applied in interpreting collective bargaining agreements
in the public sector. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Local 298 v. City
of Manchester, 116 N.J. 665, _ 366 A.2d 874, 876 (1976); cf. Town of Windsor v. Windsor
Police Dep't Employees Ass'n, 154 Conn. 530, , 227 A.2d 65, 68 (1967) (interpreting state
statute based on NLRA). See generally Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public
Employment Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MicH. L. Rzv. 891, 904-08
(1969). The case law under the NLRA has been applied to collective bargaining agreements
with public school teachers. See, e.g., Smigel v. Southgate Community School Dist., 388
Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305 (1972) (interpreting Michigan statute based on the NLRA).
158. In Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 37 Wis. 483, 155
N.W.2d 78 (1967), bargaining over the school curriculum was found not to be a mandatory
subject of bargaining, and thus the school board could determine unilaterally what the curriculum should be. The court stated: "Subjects of study are within the scope of basic educational
policy and additionally are not related to wages, hours, and conditions of employment." Id.
at ____ 155 N.W.2d at 82-83. The court, however, found the school calendar to be a subject
for mandatory bargaining in as much as it related to hours of employment.
The Connecticut court in West Hartford Educ. Ass'n. v. DeCourcey, 162 Conn. 566, 295
A.2d 526 (1972), applied Supreme Court decisions interpreting the NLRA, particularly NLRB
v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1950), and Fibreboard Paper Prod. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), in determining the scope of collective bargaining in the public
schools. The state court noted that the Supreme Court frequently turned to "history and
custom of the industry" to determine the extent to which an issue is negotiable. 162 Conn.
at -,
295 A.2d at 536. The court then determined that class size, teaching load, the
assignment and compensation of teachers supervising extracurricular activities, and a grievance arbitration procedure were mandatory subjects of bargaining. Id. at _ 295 A.2d at
536-38. The length of the school day and the school calendar, although related to hours of
employment, were found to be exempt from mandatory bargaining by state statute. Id. at
-,

295 A.2d at 534.

159. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958); West Hartford
Educ. Ass'n v. DeCourcey, 162 Conn. 566, _ 295 A.2d 526, 533 (1972). If it is determined
that a subject is permissive, it is an unfair labor practice for a party to insist upon its inclusion
in the contract to the point of forcing an impasse. 356 U.S. at 349; Detroit Police Officers
Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 391 Mich. 44, _ 214 N.W.2d 803, 808 (1974). As in the private
sector, "[o]ne important distinction between a 'mandatory' and a 'permissive' subject of
bargaining is that a party may take on a permissive subject without first entering into the
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to replace the lay faculty with clergy or with video machines, or
decides to institute a pilot project, he may do so unilaterally, especially if such a managerial decision is dictated by religious policy.
At most he will be obligated to confer with the lay faculty concerning the impact of that decision, a purely secular concern. 60
Thus the distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects
of bargaining applied in the private sector and in those states that
have adopted provisions based on the NLRA is particularly helpful
in refuting any alleged threat to the bishop's right to manage schools
as he deems wise. Although a determination whether a demand by
a lay teachers' union is subject to mandatory or merely permissive
bargaining requires the application of the same tests used to make
such determinations in disputes involving any other private employer, the possibility of a religious motive for management decisions provides an additional criterion for distinguishing subjects
clearly within the discretion of the employer from merely secular
concerns such as wages, hours, and conditions of employment vital
to the economic well-being of lay employees. Any intrusion into the
religious decisions of the church-employer is precluded by the standards articulated by the Board and the courts for protecting management interests in the private, non-religious sector.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPRIETY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN

PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

Through adoption of the tripartite test in Lemon v. Kurtzman",'
and Tilton v. Richardson,"2 the Supreme Court abandoned the
,214 N.W.2d at 809 n.7; see In re Rutgers, 645 Gov'T EmPL.
bargaining process." Id. at REL. REP. (BNA) E-1, E-3 (1976). The normal restriction on the employer's right to take
unilateral action as to a mandatory subject does not apply during the term of an existing
collective bargaining agreement under which the employer has expressly or impliedly retained
the right to take the action in question. See Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1658, 1660-61, 58
L.R.R.M. 1280, 1281-82 (1965); American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Local
570 P.2d 388, 392 (1977) (waiver
1893 v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 31 Or. App. 251, -,
by failure to object). If the parties reach a bona fide impasse in negotiations, the employer
would be free to institute his own proposals unilaterally. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills,
Inc., 337 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1949).

160. Beloit City School Bd., 578 GOV'T EMPL.

REL.

REP. (BNA) B-11, B-13 (1974). The

Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission held in Beloit that when educational policies
which are permissive subjects of bargaining have an impact upon teacher's hours, salaries or
working conditions, the school board must bargain over that impact.
161. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
162. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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strict "hands-off" theory of non-establishment in favor of one emphasizing governmental neutrality, a shift necessitated in part by
the expanding scope of governmental regulation.'6 3 The first question to be resolved uhder this test is whether the regulation is supported by a secular legislative purpose. In answering this question
the Court has tended to look at the expressed purpose of the regulation to determine if it reflects a secular objective appropriate for
governmental action."6 4 The second part of the test focuses on
whether the effect of the regulation is to advance or inhibit religion.
The issue is not whether some benefit or detriment accrues to a
religious institution but whether the primary effect advances religion."65 Finally, the Court considers whether the administration of
the regulation results in an excessive entanglement with religion.
This part of the test involves an examination of "the character and
purposes of the institution benefited, the nature of the aid provided
by the state, and the resulting relationship between the government
and the religious authority."'66 This change in the interpretation of
the proscriptions of the establishment clause recognizes that the
policies underlying both the establishment and free exercise clauses
are best served by striking a balance that achieves governmental
neutrality and noninvolvement in religious affairs but allows for
effective governmental regulation of secular activity.
Recent cases applying the Lemon-Tilton test support an extension of the principles underlying this test that would result in approval of the application of the NLRA to labor relations in parochial
schools. One of these cases was Hunt v. McNair,'17 in which the
Supreme Court upheld a complex statutory scheme for the issuance
of revenue bonds by the state to benefit a religious college. The
legislation provided for the issuance of bonds by the state to finance
construction of building projects at the school. Title to the buildings
would remain in the state until the loan evidenced by the bonds was
repaid by the college. Prior to this repayment the college would lease
163. See Giannella, supra note 73, at 1382-83; Giannella, supra note 53, at 514-15. It has
been suggested that, in cases in which the establishment clause is involved, religion should
be given a more restrictive definition than in those in which free exercise rights are being
considered. Galanter, Religious Freedoms In The United States:A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis.
L. REv. 217, 265-68.
164. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 613; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 678-79.
165. 403 U.S. at 679.
166. 403 U.S. at 615; see Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 684-89.
167. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
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the buildings from the state. Each lease contained a clause restricting the use of the building to nonreligious purposes and allowing the
state to inspect the college to ensure that this clause was not violated. The document reconveying the buildings to the college contained a clause prohibiting their use for religious purposes. 68
In Hunt the Court had little difficulty finding a secular purpose
for the state's action and found that the primary effect of the
scheme was not to aid the religious activities at the college. The
Court then focused on the entanglement issue, in particular the
plaintiffs' assertion that the broad powers given the state by the
statute "[t]o establish rules and regulations for the use of a project" 9 were so sweeping as inevitably to result in the entanglement
of the state in religion. Noting state supreme court decisions limiting the scope of this regulatory power, the Court held that the state's
control, as judicially construed, did not constitute an excessive entanglement in religion. 70
Similarly, the application of the NLRA to parochial schools is
directed solely toward the secular aspects of school administration.
As in Hunt, any consideration of the possibility of entanglement in
religious affairs caused by the Board's assertion of jurisdiction
should recognize that the scope of regulation in question has been
limited by judicial and administrative decisions. Thus, the Board
is able to order bargaining with the. lay teachers but is unable to
compel agreement on substantive terms. Likewise, the Board is unable to dictate managemental policy to the employer in the parochial schools. The Board's power is limited solely to the secular
issue of labor relations between the parochial schools' administration and the lay teachers in those schools.
In Roemer v. Board of Public Works,1 7' a plurality of the Court
distinguished educational institutions that are pervasively sectarian
from those that are merely religiously affiliated. The plurality in
Roemer upheld the aid in question by subdividing the "primary
effect" element of the tripartite test into two parts. The first part
requires that the institution not be so pervasively sectarian tht secular activities could not be separated from religious activities; the
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 747-48.
426 U.S. 736 (1976).
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second requires that only secular activities be funded.," A majority
of the Court in Roemer would have approved the district court's
holding that the schools involved were not "pervasively sectarian,11 3 despite a finding that mandatory theology74 courses at the
institutions contained elements of indoctrination.'
The first portion of the primary effect element, requiring a finding
that the institution is not pervasively sectarian, resembles the administrative standard the Board employs in asserting its jurisdiction. The Board will not assert jurisdiction over schools that are
"completely religious" but will assert jurisdiction over those that
are "merely religiously associated.' 7 5 In "religiously associated"
schools, the religious activities are not so pervasive that the Board
cannot separate the secular from religious activities in order to regulate the former. The constitutional permissibility of state regulation
of the secular aspects of the parochial schools is implicit in the
decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,7 which held that the state
could not monopolize secular education. A sectarian school is not
established merely to conduct religious activities; nor is it simply
and exclusively a church institution for the teaching or practice of
religion. Rather, private schools are integrated into the total educa77
tional system of the state.
Roemer is also important for Justice White's concurring opinion,
in which he stated that the Court's finding that the secular and
religious functions of the institutions were separable presupposed its
finding of no excessive entanglement under the third part of the
tripartite test adopted in Lemon.' Justice White adhered to the
172. Id. at 755-59. The first subtest of the primary effect question demonstrates the validity
of treating certain interests as secularly relevant religious factors and confirms the contention
that acknowledgment of a religious interest is consistent with the concept of government
neutrality toward religion.
173. Id. at 770.
174. Id. at 759.
175. See note 33 supra & accompanying text.
176. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
177. Kauper, Church and State: Cooperative Separatism, 60 MICH. L. REV. 1, 34, 36, 38
(1961); see note 89 supra. Implicit in Everson v. Board of Educ., 380 U.S. 1 (1947), is the
acknowledgement that pivate schools perform a concurrent function with public schools,
since assistance for specific purposes not directly and immediately identified with religious
instruction was upheld as serving a public purpose. Id. at 5-8; see Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
178. 426 U.S. at 769 (White, J., concurring); see 44 TENN. L. Rv. 377,385 (1977) (Supreme
Court has gradually assimilated the entanglement issue into the "primary effect" test).
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view he previously expressed in Lemon that the excessive entanglement test was "unnecessary" and "superfluous."' 79 Under Justice
White's analysis, the entanglement criteria would serve little purpose in evaluating the propriety of the Board's role in collective
bargaining in the parochial schools inasmuch as the primary effect
element of the test accomplishes that for which both elements formerly were employed.
Recent aid cases have also distinguished between statutes that
benefit parochial school students as well as students in other schools
from those that benefit the parochial school directly. Under the socalled "child benefit" theory,' a statute providing aid to all schoolchildren, including those in parochial schools, does not have the
primary effect of aiding religion. In Wolman v. Walter,'8' for example, the challenged statute provided psychological, speech, and
hearing diagnostic services on the school grounds and therapeutic
treatment off the school premises for those needing such treatment.
The Court held that a statute providing health services to all schoolchildren did not have the primary effect of aiding religion and that
supervision by the state of public employees working within the
parochial schools did not constitute entanglement. 8 2 Similarly, leg179. 426 U.S. at 768; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 664 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
180. In these cases the Court found that the state aid was furnished to the children and
their parents, not to the parochial schools. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
243-44 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7, 17-18 (1947); Cochran v. Louisiana,
281 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1930).
The effect of a Board accommodation of the sectarian interests of the employer and the
secular interests of the employees is de minimis. The primary benefit in the form of organizational and collective bargaining rights accrues to the individual employees and not to a
religious organization. This form of "aid" has been upheld in Eversonand Allen. The primary
effect of required bargaining and accommodation of the religious interests of the employer is
to ensure that each employee will be treated similarly to other private sector employees. It
guarantees that the religious nature of the employer or institution does not penalize the
employees by the loss of their rights under the NLRA. The interference with the first amendment rights of the employer is less than that resulting from a law requiring an employer to
close his business on certain days. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)
(Sunday closing law upheld as not in aid of religion).
181. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
182. The court found diagnostic service to have "little or no educational content" and thus
not to be "closely associated with the educational mission of the nonpublic schools." Id. at
244. As to the off-premises activities, the Court stated "[i]t can hardly be said that the
supervision of public employees performing public functions on public property creates an
excessive entanglement between church and state." Id. at 248. Both these lines of reasoning
are applicable to the employees of the Board in their contacts with the lay teachers in the
parochial schools.
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islation designed to facilitate the organizational rights of employees,
including lay employees of religious institutions, benefits the lay
teacher and does not directly promote or inhibit the teaching of
religion in the parochial schools. Nor does the Board's supervision
of its employees who administer religiously neutral legislation in the
parochial schools constitute excessive entanglement in religion.
Chief Justice Burger has concluded that there are three principle
evils against which the establishment clause is intended to protect:
"sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."' 83 Although one might conclude, as did
Justice Black, that "books. . . are the heart of any school" and that
state financial support in this area "actively and directly assists the
teaching and propogation of sectarian religious viewpoints,"'' 4 it
does not follow that the application of a legislative scheme to promote the secular interests of an employee in a religiously neutral
manner actively intrudes upon the religious independence of the
sectarian employer. Most recently, the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Cummins v. ParkerSeal Co.'"8 provides added support for this viewpoint. There the court rejected a challenge to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,188 a statutory program as comprehensive as that of the NLRA. The plaintiff in Cummins alleged that a
regulation promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) requiring an employer, in the absence of
undue hardship, reasonably to accommodate an employee's religious practices violated both the free exercise and establishment
clauses. Applying the tripartite establishment test set forth in
Lemon, the court held that the regulation neither advanced nor
inhibited religion; rather, it served the permissible purpose of prohibiting religious discrimination and guaranteeing reasonable job
security. 18 7 Although the court recognized that the enforcement
mechanism given the EEOC was extensive, it held that the Com183. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 668 (1970)).
184. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 253 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting).
185. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65. (1976),
vacated and remanded on rehearing,433 U.S. 903 (1977) (remanded for further consideration
of employer's duty of reasonable accomodation in light of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977)).
186. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-1 to 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-17 (Supp.
V 1975).
187. 516 F.2d at 553.
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mission determines "issues . . . considered in the labor relations
context, and their resolution certainly does not necessitate any government entanglement with religion." ' The precedential value of
this decision is very limited, however. The Supreme Court remanded Cummins for further consideration in light of its decision
in Trans World Airlines v. "Hardison,
,81
which held that the hardship
resulting from the restructuring of the seniority provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement would render any attempted accommodation unreasonable. 190 Inasmuch as the Court in Hardison
did not reach the constitutional merits of the EEOC's accommodation requirement, the Sixth Circuit's broader discussion of the constitutional challenge to the requirement was neither accepted nor
rejected by the Supreme Court in its remand order.
The criteria for evaluating claims based on the establishment
clause, which have evolved primarily from a line of cases involving
financial aid to religious institutions,"' may pose difficulties when
188. Id. at 554. The employer in Cummins objected that in determining whether the
employee's claim was based on genuinely religious grounds the EEOC would be forced to
study and evaluate religious doctrine. Id. This objection is identical to that raised in Catholic

Bishop, namely that Board proceedings would necessarily examine "the Church's religious
policies and beliefs." 559 F.2d at 1124. The court in Cummins felt that an EEOC investigation
would "require no more government involvement in religion than the concededly nonexcessive
entanglement that occurs when a state must determine whether a purported church qualifies
for a property tax exemption." 516 F.2d at 554 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
674-76 (1970)). It is noteworthy that § 710 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-9 (Supp. V 1975) provides that all hearings and investigations conducted by the
EEOC are identical to those of the NLRB provided for in § 11 of the NLRA, 20 U.S.C. § 161
(1970).
189. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
190. Id. at 70. The Court rested its holding that a seniority system instituted under a
collective bargaining agreement need not be violated to accommodate religious beliefs of an
employee on § 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970),
which provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subchapter it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . ..provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin . ...

432 U.S. at 81-82. The statutory section and the Court's interpretation of it reaffirm the
deference given to collective bargaining by both the legislature and the judiciary.
191. In Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), the
Court stated that most establishment cases involve education and that these cases are divisible into two categories: "those dealing with religious activities within public schools, and
those involving public aid in varying forms to sectarian education institutions." Id. at 772.

19781

PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

applied to nonfinancial benefits accruing to employees or to indirect
economic burdens facing the employer as a result of congressional
concern for labor relations. In these circumstances, only the
"primary effect" portion of the Lemon test is useful in assessing
whether regulation of such matters unconstitutionally encroaches
upon establishment guarantees.19 2 Unlike the aid cases in which the
government action directly promotes religion, thedirect and immediate effect of neutral labor legislation is to promote secular interests by assuring the separation of the religious from the secular; no
public instrumentality is used to further or inhibit a religious belief."9 3 Once the secular aspects of the parochial schools have been
separated from the religious, the Board is able to defer to the church
concerning religious doctrine while compelling the church to defer
to it in the area of labor relations.
1 94
The balancing test used in evaluating free exercise challenges,
which compares the governmental interest with the degree of harm
to the individual's rights, may provide an appropriate alternative to
the primary effect test in analyzing problems arising from governmental supervision of labor relations in the parochial schools. The
broad effect of such an approach would be to accommodate the
secular interests of the government and the religious interests of the
individuals involved for the purpose of maintaining governmental
neutrality. This approach has been applied in other situations implicating the religion clauses. In Gillette v. United States, 5 for
The test employed in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and in Nyquist was developed
in cases analyzing financial subsidies to religious schools and, as such, its application is best
limited to that type of case.
192. Cf. Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to
Religion, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 1174, 1190 (1974) ("If an aid program successfully passes effects
scrutiny, entanglement analysis is largely superfluous.")
193. Any supervisory contacts are confined strictly to achieving the secular objectives of
the NLRA. In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court relied on the principle
that the first amendment merely requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups
of religious believers. Id. at 15-16. This does not require the state to be the adversary or
advocate of the church.
194. See note 70 & accompanying text supra. Professor Forkosch, analogizing to employment discrimination cases such as Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977),
and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), suggests that the intent of the regulation
challenged on establishment grounds be dispositive of the constitutional issue. Thus, the
question would be whether the intent is "principally or primarily one to aid or foster religion,
or prefer one religion over another." Forkosch, supra note 63, at 657-59.
195. 402 U.S. 437 (1971) (upholding § 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50
U.S.C. App. § 4560) (1970), providing conscientious objective exemption on basis of religious
belief).
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example, the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute granting exemptions from compulsory military service to the adherents of certain religions. The decision implicitly recognized that a slight effect
of promoting or inhibiting religious interests must yield to a compelling governmental interest. "
If one accepts that the principle of governmental neutrality in
religious affairs is the common thread underlying the two religion
clauses of the first amendment,197 it follows that a compelling secular governmental purpose should prevail over allegations that the
regulation at issue results in the advancement or inhibition of religious belief. 19 8 This analysis is similar to that advanced in the cases
challenging Sunday closing laws in which the Court has held that a
state's interest in providing a uniform day of rest outweighed the
indirect promotion or inhibition of religion which resulted from the
legislation. 9' Similarly, it is appropriate to balance the impact of
the Board's assertion of jurisdiction on the religious interests of
the employer against society's interest in peaceful labor relations
and increased demands for collective bargaining rights by lay
teachers in the parochial schools.2 0 Any conflict between these
196. 401 U.S. at 461-62. See also Warner, NLRB Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools:
Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 73 Nw. U.L. REa. 463 (1978) (compelling governmental
interest in enforcing the NLRA outweighs any entanglement caused by the Board's assertion
of jurisdiction).
197. Giannella, supra note 41, at 513, 521, 532.
198. This would avoid any examination of the degree to which religious doctrine is compromised by involvement in collective bargaining, or of whether the church is able to assert a
genuine religious interest in order to invoke the traditional free exercise protection.
199. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449-51 (1961). If the state regulation does not
make the religious belief or practice itself unlawful but only results in an economic disadvantage to the practitioner, such a burden on belief is viewed as incidental and will not outweigh
a legitimate state purpose. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 603, 606 (1961). In Linscott v.
Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971), the court held that
the dismissal of an employee for refusal to pay union dues on religious grounds was not so
severe a burden as to outweigh the government interest in furthering peaceful labor relations
by means of collective bargaining. Id. at 18.
An overriding governmental interest is generally found when the need for governmental
regulation is great or when enforcement of the regulation would be impossible if a broad
exemption were granted. Compare McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 449-52 (valid state
purpose and no alternative means found) with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,406-09 (1963)
(exemption would not render statutory scheme unworkable).
200. The parochial employer has not demonstrated that an alternative method of collective
bargaining with lay teachers serves the compelling governmental interests in collective bargaining. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224-25 (1972) (Amish way of life presents viable
alternative to formal secondary school education); Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.
Iowa 1974), aff'd sub nom. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) (viable alternatives
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interests may be mitigated if the Board recognizes an independent
area or managemental prerogative in which the employer's religious
interests are protected absolutely.
CONCLUSION

President Jefferson's "wall of separation"20 1 between church and
state has long been recognized as untenable fiction. The difficult
issues raised in church-state relations are clouded further by the
emotion and bias that often adheres to the conflicts in which these
issues arise. It is clear, however, that there is no constitutional injury in the application of a neutral law which neither imposes nor
restricts any religious belief and which neither mandates nor prohibits any religious activity or teaching. As in other sectors of the
economy, the religious employer may not cherish the responsibility
to bargain with the elected representative of its employees. This
responsibility, however, may not be avoided merely because the
employer is affiliated with a church or because its employees are
working in a religiously associated environment. There is no constitutional right to commit unfair labor practices. The interests of the
lay teachers in their wages, hours, and conditions of employment
demand that they be afforded the rights granted by the NLRA when
to do so would not directly affect the religious interests of their
employer.
found to prison hair length rule which infringed Indian's religious beliefs). Nor is the complete
exemption of parochial schools from NLRA coverage a viable alternative for the government
or for the thousands of employees who would be denied their rights under the Act. The only
viable alternative to the Board's attempted assertion of jurisdiction over "religiously associated" schools is a complete assertion of jurisdiction over all religious schools, which the
church opposes.
201. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbridge Baptist Association, quoted in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).

